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In this thesis we present and defend an account of morality, which represents prin-
cipled particularism. Principled particularism holds that there is no fixed and finite
set of finite moral principles, which entails all moral judgements. On the other hand,
principled particularism claims that for any particular moral judgement there is a
finite set of finite moral principles which entails that judgement. Our version of
principled particularism is based on default moral reasons and their logic. Default
reasons are divided into foundational and derived default reasons and their logic is
nonmonotonic. Foundational default reasons play the role of basic moral beliefs,
whereas derived default reasons are based on them. The nonmonotonicity of the
logic is caused by the plausible assumption that moral reasons behave holistically - a
reason can have a different moral import in different contexts. We also discuss a few
rival doctrines, which are either based on certain defeasible moral generalizations or
hedged moral principles. We conclude that defeasible generalizations face epistemo-
logical problems and hedged moral principles are too weak to capture all of ethics.
Finally, we discuss some features in our account and compare it to the well-known
method of narrow reflective equilibrium.
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Tässä työssä esitellään ja puolustetaan eettistä kantaa, joka edustaa periaattel-
lista moraalipartikularismia. Periaatteellisen moraalipartikularismin mukaan ei ole
olemassa kiinnitettyä ja äärellistä joukkoa äärellisiä moraaliperiaatteita, josta seu-
raa kaikki moraaliarvostelmat. Toisaalta periaattellisessa moraalipartikularismissa
väitetään, että jokaiselle yksittäiselle moraaliarvostelmalle on olemassa äärellinen
joukko äärellisiä moraaliperiaatteita, josta kyseinen arvostelma seuraa. Työssä es-
itettävä periaatteellinen moraalipartikularismi perustuu oletusarvoisiin moraalisyi-
hin ja niiden logiikkaan. Oletusarvoiset moraalisyyt jaetaan pohjimmaisiin syihin
ja niistä muokattuihin syihin, ja niiden keskinäisten vuorovaikutusten logiikka on
ei-monotoninen. Pohjimmaiset syyt edustavat perustavia moraaliuskomuksia, kun
taas muokatut syyt perustuvat niihin. Käsiteltävän logiikan ei-monotonisuus syn-
tyy siitä oletuksesta, etta moraalisyyt käyttäytyvät vaihtelevasti; moraalisyyllä voi
olla erilainen moraalinen vaikutus eri yhteyksissä. Työssä käsitellään myös kilpaile-
via näkemyksiä, jotka perustuvat joko kumottavissa oleviin moraalisiin yleistyksiin
tai moraaliperiaatteisiin, joihin sisältyy jokin lisäehto. Työssä tullaan siihen lop-
putulokseen, että kumottavissa oleviin moraalisiin yleistyksiin liittyy tietoteoreet-
tisia ongelmia ja toisaalta lisäehdoin varustetut moraaliperiaatteet ovat liian heikkoja
määräämään kaikki eettiset arvostelmat. Lopuksi tarkastellaan joitain esitetyn teo-
rian piirteitä sekä verrataan sitä tunnettuun metodiin, jossa pyritään moraaliusko-
musten kapeaan tasapainoon.
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11 Introduction
The goal of this thesis is to present and defend an account of morality, which repre-
sents principled particularism. The term was introduced by Richard Holton in [5],
where he describes its meaning and defends his own view falling under this descrip-
tion. Traditional moral theories represent generalism, which means accepting the
assumption that there is a fixed and finite set of finite moral principles that entails
all moral judgements. Moral particularism, on the other hand, means the rejection
of this assumption. As a matter of fact, there are numerous different characteriza-
tions of moral particularism in the literature (see e.g. [6]). First philosophers to
examine the idea of moral particularism, including Jonathan Dancy (see e.g. [2],
[4]), John Mcdowell (see e.g. [12]) and arguably Aristotle (see [1]), had more rad-
ical interpretations for particularism. Nevertheless, by particularism we mean the
thesis presented above. Principled particularism is a special sort of particularism.
It is a doctrine, which is supposed to combine the good qualities of particularism
and generalism in a midway position still representing particularism. In principled
particularism, it is claimed that for any moral judgement, there is a finite set of
finite principles that entails the judgement. However, there is no fixed set of princi-
ples that entail all judgements. Consequently, we are claiming that generalists have
understood the logic of moral principles and judgements in a wrong way.
It is widely agreed that a moral theory should justify the moral judgements that
we make. In addition, a moral theory should help us finding the right judgements.
Both of these demands cause problems for particularists in general. For principled
particularism, however, the first qualification is fulfilled automatically. A justifica-
tion for a particular moral verdict is the set of principles that entail that verdict.
Nevertheless, the other qualification poses a challenge for principled particularism.
Since the justifying principles vary from case to case, we do not know what prin-
ciples to use in a novel situation. It seems that they cannot guide our way to the
right judgement. As a matter of fact, Richard Holton concludes that in principled
particularism, principles will have a very limited role for this purpose (p. 4 in [5]).
In Holton’s account the role is indeed very limited. In [5] he constructs principles
that only apply to moral cases which are identical in their morally relevant features.
Therefore these principles offer no help for judging a novel situation.
In this thesis we take a different approach to principled particularism, which is
supposed to handle also the guiding role of principles. A major advantage in our
account is that in a given moral case, we do not formulate a principle which subsumes
2all the details under it. Instead, we examine all the morally relevant features in a case
and thus we can identify the contribution of each particular feature to the overall
moral judgement. What remains fixed from case to case is the logic of reasons. But
doesn’t this entail generalism? No, since the logic of reasons is nonmonotonic with
respect to adding descriptive features to a situation. Introduction of new features can
alter the contribution of original reasons fundamentally. Hence we cannot construct
a general principle which consists of reasons with fixed moral imports and their
logic. There are infinitely many possible acts. Thus there are infinitely many ways
in which features of acts can possibly interact with each other. Consequently, all
the varying interactions cannot be coded into comprehensible and finite set of finite
principles, which would entail all moral verdicts. Nevertheless, principled reasoning
can offer us justification in particular situations as well as guide our reasoning in
new situations.
In our approach, the guiding role of principles is located in default reasons and their
logic. Default reason is a contributory reason which has a given moral valence by
default. They offer us a starting point when searching for the correct moral verdict
in a novel situation. On the other hand, the justificary role of principles is also
fulfilled in our framework. In a given case, the moral verdict is justified by the
default reasons that are present, by other morally relevant features, by the logic of
default reasons and by the assumption that nothing relevant has been ignored. The
last part of the justification is crucial, since it guarantees that the reasons will not
change their polarities further in the case under scrutiny.
Inside the family of default reasons we draw a distinction between foundational de-
fault reasons and derived default reasons. Foundational default reasons guarantee
that our judgements are not systematically wrong. They function as basic beliefs
in our moral epistemology, which represents foundationalism. A very desirable fea-
ture in our account is that foundational default reasons claim less than traditional
principles, but still offer a solid basis for moral thinking. A moral reasoner can also
update his foundational default reasons and thereby construct derived default rea-
sons. Derived default reasons are ultimately based on foundational default reasons,
but they offer a more fine-grained justification and guidance in complex situations.
Derived default reasons can also explain how one can make progress in morality. An
advanced moral reasoner has updated his default reasons multiple times and can
thus explain why some feature has a different moral import in different contexts.
Our goal is to present an account of morality, which is based on foundational and
derived default reasons.
3The structure of this thesis is the following. In the remaining subsections of this
introduction we motivate the debate between generalism and particularism by taking
a brief historical outlook on the topic. We also explain what is meant by holism
of reasons, which is an essential concept for our later discussion. In Chapter 2, we
define principled particularism and its rival doctrines in a more detailed manner.
We also describe Richard Holton’s account of principled particularism and explain
how it is developed further in this thesis.
Chapter 3 is one of the corner stones of this thesis. We present a formal framework
for default reasoning, which was originally published by John Horty in [7]. In that
chapter the discussion is quite technical and concentrates more on the logical rather
than ethical aspects of default reasoning. However, Horty himself recognizes the
connection of his default logic to moral particularism, by devoting one section in
[7] for it. Nevertheless, his discussion on the topic is quite general, since his main
interest is in the formal aspects of practical and moral reasons. In the later chapters
we focus on the very task of developing a viable ethical account based on his default
logic. Before this, however, we study a rival account for principled particularism.
In Chapter 4, we discuss Sean McKeever’s and Michael Ridge’s arguments for gen-
eralism. More precisely, we present and critize their default principles. We conclude
that default principles cannot handle the complexity in morality, which is caused by
the holism of reasons. McKeever and Ridge do not reject the holism of reasons, but
they try to handle the phenomenom with hedged principles. We argue that their
default principles suffer from serious weaknesses. Default principles cannot capture
all of ethics. As a matter of fact, we try to modify their principles, but observe
that it is far from clear if even these modified default principles work correctly. The
problem in default principles is that they try to claim more than Holton’s principles
in [5], which are also hedged with ceteris paribus clauses. The strenght and weakness
in Holton’s principles is that their scope consists only of acts which have the same
morally relevant features. An altered situation calls for a new principle. On the
other hand, Mckeever and Ridge try to squeeze the complexities caused by changes
in relevant features inside the principle. This, we think, is not a very promising
alternative, since reasons behave holistically and escape principled patterns. Our
main argument is that default principles fail to capture all of ethics.
In Chapter 5 we consider different linguistic interpretations for evaluative sentences
and the corresponding accounts of moral epistemology. We present further criticism
towards defeasible generalizations in morality. In [8], Margaret Little and Mark
4Lance develop hedged principles based on certain priviledged conditions. They are
conditions that are supposed to reveal the true nature of a given (morally relevant)
concept. Moreover, the defeasible principles are supposed to work in priviledged
conditions, while the exceptions are left outside the priviledged conditions. However,
we argue that the concept of priviledged conditions is problematic. A detailed
argument is presented in Chapter 4, but the basic idea is the following. It is unclear
whether we acquire knowledge about priviledged conditions with the help of the
true nature of the concept in question or vice versa. Moreover, in our account
we can cope without such problematic concept. In Chapter 5 we also present our
own account of moral epistemology. We describe the concepts of foundational and
derived default reasons. Furthermore, we describe how a moral agent can update
his default reasons in order to manage complex moral situations properly and be
well prepared to encounter new situations.
In Chapter 6 we discuss further our account of morality and present some desirable
properties that it has. Somewhat surprisingly, our process of updating default rea-
sons has some similarities with John Rawls’ notion of narrow reflective equilibrium,
which is presented in [14]. We compare our method to Rawls’ notion of revising
principles. Finally, we conclude that our account represents principled particular-
ism, but is in a sense even closer to generalism than Holton’s approach.
We end this introductory part by briefly discussing what is, regrettably, omitted in
this thesis. An important topic that is omitted concerns the relation of (principled)
particularism to some well-known metaethical positions. For instance, all that we
are discussing is incompatible with non-cognitivist pictures of morality. We are
assuming all the way that moral judgements have truth values. However, so far
the particularist literature has discussed these topics surprisingly little. Therefore
the task of defending our view against such rivals is utterly beyond the scope of
this thesis. Nevertheless, for those interested in this topic, we advice to take look
at Jonathan Dancy’s arguments on p.53-70 in [4]. For instance, he takes certain
aspects of particularism to be arguments against moral expressivism.
1.1 Motivation and Historical Background
Traditionally the ultimate goal of moral philosophy has been to find a pattern,
which connects possible acts to normative evaluations, and classifies each act as
right, wrong or morally insignificant. As mentioned earlier, the task has also been
to explain why the given pattern is the right one. In practise, few philosophers have
5intended to give an account which gives such strictly algorithmic decision procedures
for moral situations. Nevertheless, the traditional proposals for an answer to this
problem tried to give a general solution applicable to any act. For instance, according
to one variant of utilitarism, an act is right if and only if it maximizes the expected
happiness. Kant claimed instead that an act is right if and only if it could be
generalized into a universally binding imperative. In addition, there are the doctrines
of virtue theory and ideal observer theory to name a few. Admittely, all of these
approaches have some initial attractiveness. However, all of them are vulnerable
to well-known thought experiments in which the approach gives an intuitively false
solution. For instance, a counterexample directed to utilitarianism goes as follows.
The sheriff of a village has reliable evidence that there will be a huge mob if they
do not find someone guilty of a series of murders made in the town. Sadly, they
have no clue who the murderer is. However, the sheriff can blame someone innocent
and put him in prison for a long time in order to avoid the mob. According to
one form of hardy utilitarism it would be morally right to do so, since it would
maximize the overall happiness. One person would suffer without a reason, but
all the rest would be better off. Nevertheless, there is intuitively something very
suspicious to punish an innocent man. It violates justice. Silmilar worries emerge
in many other situations. Sometimes your act is very injust when your only goal is
to maximize happiness and sometimes you make bad moral choices when you value
justice over all other moral dimensions. Perhaps you do not appreciate friendship
enough when weighted against justice. For example, should you reveal your friend
to police because of her minor crime?
In 1930 William Ross challenged the traditional views of morality in his book The
Right and The Good [16]. His approach was pluralistic unlike the doctrines above.
For Ross, moral landscape consists of "prima facie duties". These duties include
fidelity, benevolence, self-improvement etc. For Ross, there is no universal principle
telling if an act is right or wrong. Instead, one has to consider all these prima
facie duties in a given act. He does not give an exact way of weighting these duties
in general. He writes that the weights of different duties vary between different
acts. Put differently, loyalty is sometimes much more important aspect than self-
improvement, whereas in another context their weights are in an opposite order.
Also, sometimes some particular prima facie duty may have weight zero. This makes
sense; some morally relevant actions have nothing to do with, say loyalty and so it
does not appear in our considerations. Ross does not try to give any general ordering
of importance to prima facie duties or any algorithm how they would determine the
6moral status of an action as a whole. He leaves much room for moral judgement.
However, if an action fullfils some prima facie duty it is always a reason in favour of
performing the action. Of course, it is also possible that, all things considered, one
should avoid the action since it violates other duties, which alone or together speak
more against the action, than the original reason in favour of the action.
After the publication of Ross’ famous book it has become more popular to focus
on all the different reasons for and against an action, especially for deontologists.
Reasons like Ross’ prima facie duties are widely known as pro tanto reasons; reasons
which favour doing or avoiding an action, but which do not as such determine
the moral status of an action. Then we have also pro toto or overall reasons, which
describe what ought to be done when all pro tanto reasons are considered as a whole.
Note that this distinction would collapse in the context of classic non-pluralistic
moral theories. Every pro tanto reason is automatically a pro toto reason, since
there is only one moral consideration which determines the moral status of an action.
More recently some philosophers, including for example Jonathan Dancy and John
Mcdowell, have challenged Ross’ theory (see e.g. [2], [12]). They agree with Ross
that there is a plurality of considerations that determine the moral status of an
action. However, they claim that any consideration can function as a reason for an
action or as a reason against an action, depending on the context. Let us take a
look at an example. It is plausible to assert that if an action causes pain, the pain
that is caused is a pro tanto reason against the action. Nevertheless, it seems that
sometimes pain does not count against an action. For instance, when pain occurs in
an action that constitutes an athletic achievement. We all know about the slogan
’no pain, no gain’, commonly heard among bodybuilders or other athletes. Here
pain does not count against an action. Moreover, it seems that pain does not only
have neutral valence towards this action, but that it speaks in favor of the action.
Similarly, it is clear that breaking a promise is usually a reason against an action.
However, there are cases in which it has no moral bearing and maybe even cases
when an action is better in virtue of being an instance of promise breaking. Jonathan
Dancy, the pioneer of this view, gives an example where you have borrowed a book
from a classmate and promised to return it (p.60 in [3]). Then you find out that
the book was stolen from the library. According to Dancy, here you have no moral
obligation to keep the promise - promise keeping is simply not morally relevant
here. A situation where promise breaking makes an action better is, admittedly,
a bit harder to imagine. Perhaps breaking a promise made to some very vicious
person would improve the action.
7We are now ready to draw a distinction that is debated in contemporary metaethics.
The distinction, which has been given by Dancy, goes as follows:
Holism in the theory of reasons: A feature that is a reason in one case may be no
reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another.
Atomism in the theory of reasons: A feature that is a reason in one case must remain
a reason of the same polarity in any other case. (p. 73-74 in [4])
Jonathan Dancy was one of the first philosophers to suggest that moral reasons
behave holistically. Although the view was radical at the time of its publication,
it has received more popularity recently. After all, it is obvious that epistemic
reasons function holistically and Dancy’s idea was to explore the possibility that
moral reasons are no different in this aspect. Indeed, we agree with Dancy - many
examples show that even reasons which almost always favour committing an action
can have the opposite effect. Usually, that an action gives pleasure is a reason to do
it. However, if the pleasure is gained from a sadistic act, it makes the action even
worse than it would have been without the pleasure. Holism versus atomism debate
is closely connected to another debate over distinct views. In fact, when the topic
was new, Dancy failed to see that the debate soon to be presented is independent
from the debate between holism and atomism.
We introduce this other debate by taking a closer look at the consequences following
from the assumption that moral reasons are holistic. Intuitively a plausible way
of judging how to act in a newly encountered moral situation is to compare it
to a slightly different case, which is more familiar. Then one should either act
accordingly or explain the relevant difference between the cases. For instance, we do
not eat human flesh so neither should we eat animal flesh, unless there is a relevant
difference between humans and animals. Well, of course there are similarities and
differences between humans and animals, but are they big enough to explain the
different treatment with respect to eating? We do not want to take any stand on
this issue, but the point is that such reasoning seems to make sense. However,
Dancy noted that if reasons are able to shift their polarities in different contexts,
then it is impossible to compare even slightly different cases with each other ([4]
p.2). After all, what was a reason in another case may or may not be a reason in
the case at hand. Furthermore, it might be an opposite reason. At this point the
reader may ask that isn’t there still even some particular reasons, which never shift
8their polarities between one case and another? In fact, the answer is yes in our
opinion, even though we will assume holism in this thesis. It is sensible, however,
to grant that some reasons are in this way invariable and there are two reasons for
this. Firstly, by the definition of holism, any feature may shift its polarity, but it
is not the case that it has to. Of course, in any reasonable account of ethics which
endorses holism, it is assumed that a great many reasons can and will change their
polarities in different contexts. Otherwise the view does not assert anything new or
interesting. Secondly, the reader may have in mind the following kind of features as
suggestions for reasons which always have fixed polarity. It seems that if an act is
just, fair or admirable etc., then it is always a reason in favour of performing the
action. We agree, but such features are known as thick moral concepts. If we think
of their meaning we realize that they already have built-in moral evaluation. Such
concepts are not descriptive, and we will not include such features in the scope of
holism.
The observation outlined above along with others led Dancy to introduce a metaeth-
ical view known as moral particularism. This view is highly contrasted to the
traditional views which are taken to represent moral generalism. For Dancy, the
distinction is drawn as:
Particularism = The possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend
on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles
Generalism = The very possibility of moral thought and judgement depends on the
provision of a suitable supply of moral principles. (p.73 in [4])
As said earlier, moral particularism is a family of doctrines and even the term par-
ticularism has a few different interpretations in the literature. As a matter of fact,
in this thesis we use a different characterization of particularism than Dancy (see
Chapter 2). However, in the following we describe so general features of particu-
larism, that they apply to all versions of it. In particularist doctrines, the main
attention shifts from moral principles to particular moral cases. In fact, Dancy
claims that moral principles like golden rule or maximizing utilities have no role to
play in moral theorizing. He claims that it is exactly the dogmatic following of moral
principles that many times leads us to bad decicions. One should just take a close
look to the case at hand, and then carefully study all its morally relevant features
before making a decision. It is important to note that Dancy’s view is not sceptical
on the possibility of moral knowledge about particular cases. It agrees with gener-
alistic theories that we have moral knowledge, but disagrees on the main source of
9this knowledge. We mentioned earlier that Dancy failed to see that holism in the
theory of reasons is an orthogonal topic with moral particularism. More precisely,
Dancy claimed that particularism follows from holism. This is not the case however
(see p.27-32 in [13], or chapter 6 in [7] for a more detailed argument). The full
explanation of this fact is too long to state here. However, the key idea is that the
generalist can possibly choose her principles so that they codify all the complexities
in ethics in a way which is, after all, compatible with holism of reasons.
Dancy’s early publications on these topics have had huge impact on current the-
orizing. The debate between particularism and generalism has grown much more
complex than that of holism and atomism. For instance, Ridge and Mckeever iden-
tify five different versions of moral particularism in [13]. The book is actually a
defense of generalism, but it takes the particularist challenge seriously and devotes
almost half of its pages for contemplating on different versions of particularism and
their possibilities as a viable ethical view. The most radical form of particularism
is closest to Dancy’s original view and it claims simply that there are no true moral
principles. Other doctrines presented in the book claim, that we have no good reason
to believe that there are, that any finite codification of morality fails to capture all
moral truths, that we should not rely upon moral principles and that the possibility
of moral thought does not depend on some stock of principles (see p.15-20 in [13]).
In this thesis we are going to defend a view which represents particularism. More
precisely, it represents principled particularism. It is an account which will be de-
scribed in Chapter 2. In the next section we will present a central problem to all
forms of particularism. According to this claim, particularism "flattens the moral
landscape". Afterwards we will present a common defense to this objection and this
defense leads us to the concept of default reasoning, which is the defining aspect in
our approach to this topic.
1.2 Consequences of Holism in the Theory of Reasons
As said, the central problem for particularism is that it threatens to flatten the moral
landscape into an internally unconnected mess. Recall how radical view particular-
ism is towards principles. The following passage from Mark Lance and Margaret
little is enlightening:
Even for those otherwise attracted to the view, there is the worry that the position
(particularism) proves too much. In an unqualified form, moral holism of the sort
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outlined seems to imply that lying, killing and the infliction of pain have no more
intimate connection to wrongess than do truth-telling, healing and giving of pleasure.
After all, each, in the right context, can have positive, negative or neutral moral
import. But the morally wise person, one might have thougt, is someone who
understands that there is a deep difference in moral status between infliction of pain
and shoelace colour, even if both can against the right narrative, be bad-making.
(p.20-21 in [9])
So the problem for a particularist is that intuitively we think that some descriptive
features are more intimately connected to morality than others. Shoelace colour,
for instance, is not typically relevant for morality. Moreover, we tend to think that
some descriptive features (like truth-telling) are connected to positive evaluations,
whereas some features (like killing) have a negative moral valence. However, if any
descriptive feature can make a moral difference one way or another, the doctrine
seems to be incompatible with the intuitions. Hence a particularist has to explain
either how particularism could be developed to be compatible with the intuitions,
or why the intuitions are wrong. We choose the earlier option.
As a starting point particularists typically admit, as we do, that the evaluative realm
supervenes on the descriptive state of affairs. In other words, the moral status of
an action is determined by the descriptive features of the action. The disagreement
with the generalist lies on whether there is a pattern in this connection or not.
We also grant that moral properties are natural properties; on any given act to be
evaluated, the evalution is based completely on the descriptive features of that act.
We just mention here that it is possible to share and some particularists do share
Moore’s view that moral concepts are non-natural.
The typical strategy of particularists to make sense of the chaotic connection of moral
to non-moral is to draw a distinction between default and non-default reasons. A
default reason is a consideration which by default has a fixed moral valence. For
example, it is plausible to assert that promise-breaking, lying and violence have
negative moral import by default. If they in some context have positive valence,
then there has to be some feature of the situation, which explains why they do.
These kind of additional features of the situation, which are not themselves part
of the reason (or do not have to be part of the reason) are commonly known as
enablers. Similarly, features that would change, for instance, the polarity of pleasure
to negative or zero are identified as defeaters. In the same spirit, a feature that makes
a reason stronger (without changing its polarity) is called intensifier and a feature
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that weakens it is called a diminisher. So far so good. The distinction to default
and non-default reasons seems to give some desired structure to moral thinking,
which here started from a complete chaos, in which any feature can speak in favour
of acting or against it. Dancy thinks that this distinction is metaphysical (see e.g.
Chapter 2 in [4]). For instance, it is in the nature of pain that it is by default a
reason against an action. With the help of this new terminology, we can say that
pain is a default reason against acting, because it needs no enablers to do so. We
will later (in Chapter 4) explain on what grounds we draw the distinction between
default and non-default reasons. Moreover, we will draw another distinction among
default reasons, which divides them to foundational and derived default reasons.
It is in the metaphysical nature of foundational default reasons that we can know
their default moral valence. On the other hand, derived default reasons inherit their
moral valence from foundational default reasons.
This crude distinction of reasons seems to solve a problem, which almost all ethical
views face in some form. The problem goes as follows: One begins from a plausible
premiss that truth-telling, for example, is a moral plus. Then one identifies cases
where it is not, and modifies the initial principle to, say, truth-telling is a moral
plus except in a poker table. Then again, one realizes that truth-telling is not
important when one could avoid an insult by lying, and the lie does not cause any
serious consequences. Moreover, one can observe that truth-telling in a poker table
is relevant after all, if the lie would be about a fact outside the game. At this point
it is probably evident what our point is. The principle becomes more and more
complex. At some point one faces perhaps a point where it is only safe to say that
truth-telling is a moral plus, except when it is not. Now deafult reasons can, we
think, avoid this problem. Truth-telling is a moral reason by default. It is a reason
in any case unless it is defeated. It is worth mentioning that this issue is at the
heart of the debate against generalists. They claim that morality is not too complex
to capture with principles like above and particularists disagree. Importantly, we
believe that morality can instead be conducted with the help of an approach built
upon such seemingly modest notion of default reason.
It is evident that some form of distinction among reasons is necessary for a viable
particularist position. The distinction made above about default and non-default
reasons does not in fact survive a closer study. In [13], Ridge and Mckeever challenge
the sensibility of the distinction with a number of observations. Firstly, they write
that actually there cannot be any default reasons, since any reason needs an enabler.
They point out that for any reason and any agent, the reason is not really a reason
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unless the agent can perform the action. That I’d love to fly over trees and mountains
is not reason for me to fly, because I cannot do so. Also it seems that another feature
that is always demanded as an enabler is that the agent can refrain from acting.
Nothing can be a reason for me to stop breathing, since I cannot willingly do so. This
issue destroys the distinction, because it follows that there are no default reasons.
However, this problem is easily avoided. Mckeever and Ridge draw a distinction
between global and local enablers (p.50 in [13]). A global enabler is an enabler
which does not have any specific relation to some reasons, but which is an enabler
for any reason. Instead, local enablers are enablers only for certain reasons but not
for all of them. It is clear that this distinction is not just an ad hoc rescue operation
for the doctrine of default reasons. After all, morality is interested only in cases
where an agent has options for acting and can perform the different options. No
one would blame someone for not doing something he can not or doing something
that he cannot avoid. This is basically the well-known presupposition in ethics that
ought implies can.
So far so good. However, Ridge and Mckeever do not end their criticism of default
reasons here. They illustrate the following problem. Let us assume that the fact
that an action promotes pleasure is sometimes a reason in favour of an action, but
that this reason depends on whether the pleasure would be sadistic. They observe
that we can describe our view in two different ways. Either pleasure promoted is a
default reason and sadism its defeater, or non-sadistic pleasure is a default reason
and the pleasure as such needs the absence of sadism as an enabler. Then they
claim that the epistemological question of which description is the correct one is
hard to solve. Moreover, they ask if there is any reason to suppose that these are
just notational variants of each other. Their answer to this question is no. If the
answer really is negative, then Dancy’s view is in trouble. Recall that he held that
some reasons are default, because the metaphysical nature of the reason. Pain, for
instance, was held to have a negative import by default and because of the nature
of pain. If however, we can say equally plausibly that for instance, that pain is not
by default wrong, but only pain which could have been avoided. Then pain needs
as an enabler the fact that it could not have been avoided. That is, as an enabler
to count as a reason with negative moral import. (p.51 in [13])
We grant that without any qualifications, this is a serious problem for the distinction
between defaults and non-defaults. It does not seem to work to deny that negative
facts can be enablers. In fact, this is a point were our view will differ from Dancy’s,
so our approach will not be vulnerable to this objection. We will hold pleasure
13
as foundational default reason. A default reason about sadistic pleasure will be
a derived default reason. Both views will be plausible, depending on the level of
expertise of the moral reasoner. An advanced moral reasoner has derived the default
reason about sadistic pleasure from the foundational default about pleasure as such.
Thus, in our view it will not matter if an agent acts according to the view which
holds that pleasure is a default reason and sadism its defeater, or according to the
view that non-sadistic pleasure is a default reason and the absence of sadism its
enabler. A more detailed explanation will be given in Chapter 4. The previous
considerations were obviously only a quick glance at what we will defend later on.
To understand our view precisely, we need to define a much more detailed account
of default reasons and the related concepts. In the next Chapter we will delve the
formal aspects of default resoning and present various logical systems of default
reasoning, which are all presented in [7], written by John Horty.
Before turning into a formal treatment of the topic, we expose another problem
which Mckeever and Ridge identify concerning the distinction between default and
non-default reasons. They infer as follows. Given that any default reason can be
defeated, it follows that it needs an enabler after all. The case is so, because the
conjunction of the negations of all of its defeaters is an enabler (p.51 in [13]). They
identify a possible objection to this. One could insist that there can be infinitely
many defeaters for a reason, and thus the conjunction would be infinite. They
doubt, however that there could be infinitely many defeater types for a reason and
even if there were, even that would not necessarily be a problem. After all, the
current issue is about metaphysics of reasons, and thus the debate would collapse
to the traditional debate on the possibility of infinite conjunctions in metaphysics
or philosophy of mathematics.
Our response to this challenge is different. It seems to us that Mckeever and Ridge
are on this point somehow still stuck in their view of generalistic tradition. It is
true that in principle, the conjunction of the negations of all defeaters of a reason
is an enabler. However, it is actually just one of the many enablers. This is what
the authors have failed to see, we think, when they claim that any supposedly
default reason needs this conjunctive enabler. The point is that one or many of
the defeaters may be present and still the original reason is not defeated. This is
possible, because also defeaters can be defeated. Let us take one example. Earlier
we noted that pain is usually bad-making, but not when it is a part of an athletic
achievement. In current terminology, pain is a bad-making default reason and the
act being an instance of an athletic achievement is its defeater. But now, also this
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defeater can be defeated. For instance, if the one making this athletic achievement
does it involuntarily - let us assume he was forced to do sports. This fact seems to
defeat the original defeater’s status as a defeater. Thus, we have a situation, where
a default reason is not defeated even though one of its defeaters was present. We
could assume, for the sake of argument, that this athletism is the only defeater for
pain as a reason. Then we would have a counterexample i.e. a situation, where
Mckeever and Ridge claim that a default reason needs an enabler to remain as a
reason, but there is no such enabler present and the reason still remains as a reason.
Furthermore, we do not need the artificial assumption that there could be only
one defeater for the reason. This reasoning can be generalized to any amount of
defeaters. Assume we have a default reason and n defeaters for it. Now we do not
need the absence of all of these n defeaters in order to the default reason to remain as
a reason. It is possible that there is any number m, 1 ≤ m ≤ n, of defeaters present,
if all the m defeaters are defeated. At the end of the day, we have assumed the
holism of reasons, which entails a huge amount of possible interconnections between
different features of the act. As noted, some feature may defeat another feature
which in turn enables another etc. Somewhat surprisingly, Ridge and Mckeever do
not consider such possibilities before abandoning the whole idea of default reasons.
As a matter of fact, we think that this ignorance causes problems for their notion of
default principle, which is a totally different concept than that of a default reason
(see Chapter 4).
A further point can be stated about the complexity of moral realm. Assume that
there are nmorally relevant features (default reasons, enablers etc.), which are under
scrutiny. With the help of a little calculation we observe that there are as many
different possible combinations of these n features as there are subsets of a set of
size n. That is, there are 2n different combinations of features. This huge number
gives some justification for importance of the concept of a default reason. Otherwise
one should code all these different 2n combinations with fixed moral principles. The
point is, that if we grant that reasons can be defeated and the defeaters may have
metadefeaters, we get a very complex picture of morality. In our account we will
try to manage this complexity with the help of default reasoning. Our view will
represent principled particularism which is defined and studied in the next chapter.
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2 Principled Particularism
2.1 Generalism, Particularism and Principled Particularism
The view that we will defend in this thesis can be classified as representing principled
particularism. The term was introduced by Richard Holton in [5], where he outlines
and defends his own version of principled particularism. As Holton himself makes
clear, his goal in [5] is to explore and defend the possibility of a compromise posi-
tion between extreme particularism and generalism rather than presenting a fully
developed account. Our own approach on this debate on the role of principles and
general patterns in ethics is very sympathetic to Holton’s view. Generally speaking,
we agree on many of the assumptions and conclusions that Holton makes, but we
will try to develop the account further.
In this section, our goal is to locate our position accurately inside the family of
numerous different versions of moral particularism. In addition, we will state the
main thesis that will be defended in this essay. Before that, we will proceed as
follows. We begin by describing what is the thesis that distinguishes principled
particularism from other doctrines. After this, we will describe Holton’s view, which
represents principled particularism. This will be useful for two reasons. Firstly,
we agree with Holton on many aspects of principled particularism. Therefore, by
describing his view we will at the same time outline some of the key features that
our account will contain. Secondly, we will understand what are topics that we will
develop further than in Holton’s account and what are topics that we disagree with
him.
The idea in principled particularism is not to claim that moral principles are always
or even mostly false. Some particularist go even that far, but we will defend a weaker
claim. We think that moral principles are never sufficient to solve everything in
ethics. However, we need first to take a few steps back and take a closer look at how
traditional ethical theories see the relation of principles to descriptive features in
an act. Richard Holton nicely formulates what is common to all generalist theories
of morality. Those theories accept the following connection of descriptive features,
moral principles and moral evaluations.
Definition 2.1.1. By Generalism we mean any approach to ethics which falls under
the schema
∃P (P is a finite set of true moral principles) ∀y (y is a moral verdict) y is entailed
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by P and the non-moral truths. (p.3 in [5])
Thus the idea in generalism is that a fixed set of principles applies to all possible
acts, and the principle together with the descriptive features of the situation entail
the correct moral evaluation. Obviously in the case of utilitarism, for instance, the
variable P in the definition 2.1.1 is replaced by the principle of utility. Also in the
case of Rossian pluralism, the above schema holds. Although there is a plurality
of pro tanto reasons in Rossian approach, they have the same effect on the moral
verdict regardless of the situation that is being evaluated. We will see soon what
kind of schema is produced if allow that we can have different principles in different
situations.
The restriction concerning the finitude of moral principles in the above description of
generalism is indeed necessary. The reason for this is the following. Assume that also
an infinite set of true moral principles would qualify for the above schema. Earlier in
this thesis it was assumed that morality supervenes on the descriptive world. Thus
one could in principle construct the infinite set of so-called supervenience functions,
which assign each possible act (specified by its descriptive features) to some moral
evalution. Moreover, the set of true moral principles, P , could be replaced with
these infinitely many supervenience functions. Thus we would have a supervenience
function for each particular possible act, and together these would yield a “moral
theory” falling under the description of generalism. There is another essential point
about the finitude of moral principles in the description of generalism. It is explicitly
restricted that the number of principles is finite, but we also assume that moral
principles, which are mentioned in the schema, are of finite lenght. This prevents
the same kind of trick as with infinite amount of principles. Otherwise one could
again construct the infinite list of supervenience functions, and compile them as a
single principle, which is infinitely long. This single principle would be the infinite
conjunction of supervenience functions.
Now we have formulated moral generalism and excluded the unintended and infinite
ways of understanding the formulation. Next we will work our way towards princi-
pled particularism with the help of an analogy from the first order arithmetic. First
part of this analogy is, in fact, very simple. This simple part corresponds to the
generalist picture of morality.
Imagine a game played with natural numbers in which you are given some natural
number x and your task is to find a number y, which is greater than x. In this
game one can think of the number x as representing a description of an act in non
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moral terms. Moreover, the number y corresponds to the correct moral verdict for
the act whose identity is specified by the features coded in x. For any x, an answer
y which is smaller than x represents the erroneous moral verdict and an answer y
is greater than x represents the correct one. If morality was like this simple game,
then generalist could be happy to claim victory in the debate versus principled
particularism. The case is so, since in this game we have a solution for any x and
the solution is P : N → N such that P (x) = x + 1 = y. In other words, P is a
principle which together with the non moral truths of the act that are coded in the
number x entails the correct moral verdict y. Obviously there are (infinitely) many
other solutions for this game, but this is not essential for the analogy.
Principled particularism rejects the analogy between morality and this simple game.
However, the idea in principled particularism is far from claiming that the connec-
tion of an act to its moral evaluation is completely random as in some forms of
particularism. The way we principled particularists see morality would be analo-
gous to a similar game, except that also the correct principle P depends on the
descriptive features of the act. In a game corresponding to principled particularism
one could not give an absolute solution P which works for any x. Nevertheless, for
any x there would be a correct solution Px such that Px(x) = y. In other words,
for any act there is a principle, which together with the non moral features of the
act entail the correct moral verdict, but the correct principle depends on the act as
well. We can squeeze the previous ideas in the following schema:
Definition 2.1.2 (Principled Approach). By Principled Approach we mean any
approach to ethics which falls under the schema
∀y (y is a moral verdict) ∃(P P is a finite set of true moral principles) y is entailed
by P and the non moral truths. (p.3 in [5])
Obviously the schema Generalism entails the schema Principled Approach. If there
is a set of principles that entail all moral verdicts, then for all moral verdicts there is a
set of principles that entail them. However, the converse does not hold, which should
be obvious by the logical forms of the schemata and by the previous analogies. There
is one trivializing case worth mentioning which applies to the principled approach.
As with generalism, supervenience functions cause troubles if we do not restrict
the previous definition in some way. This time the problem is that any approach
to morality, which accepts the supervenience of moral on descriptive, would be
principled approach. For any moral evaluation, one could choose the supervenience
function connecting the act in question with its evaluation as the principle which
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is existentially quantified in the previous definition. As a matter of fact, Jackson,
Pettit and Smith remark this problem in Chapter 10 in [8]. They point out that the
supervenience functions cannot be all that connects some acts to evaluation right
and some acts to evaluation wrong. Indeed, we agree this much with them. However,
they argue further and against particularism with a semantic argument. According
to them, the predicate “being right” cannot be everything that right acts have in
common. Therefore, they claim, there has to be some descriptive pattern which
can be articulated in language and unifies right acts. Otherwise morality would be
sui generis ; a non-natural realm (p.88 in [8]). This would collapse particularism
to moorean view, which is an unwanted consequence - our version of (principled)
particularism is intended to be naturalistic. Moral properties are determined by
descriptive properties. Consequently, it seems that the presented problem of pure
predication remains for us. Jackson, Pettit and Smith argue that being right cannot
be everything that is common to right acts, otwerwise we could not understand the
predicate (p.87 in [8]).
Our response to the authors is two folded. Firstly, the problem they have pointed
out is in a risk of begging the question. Generalists argue that there is a principle
which tells what actions are right and what are wrong. Obviously, the principle
specifies what is common to all right acts. However, we have never encountered
such exceptionless principle in the literature. Secondly and more importantly, we
make the following remark. The main idea behind principled approach is similar to
popular approaches to aesthetics or humour. Arguably, there is no pattern uniting
all beautiful or funny objects, but for every beautiful or funny object there are artic-
ulable features that make the object beautiful or funny. Moreover, we do understand
what the predicate "being beautiful" means.
We will soon present our approach to this topic of connection between descriptive
and evaluative, but first we will define some key concepts rigorously. That is, with
the help of the two schemata that were exposed, we are now ready to formulate
what we mean by generalism, particularism and principled particularism. The task
of defining what we mean with these doctrines is crucial, since there are varied uses
of the terms in literature.
Definition 2.1.3. We draw the following distinctions for different metaethical doc-
trines that are involved in the debate between generalism and particularism.
(G) Generalism = acceptance of the schema of generalism as presented in the defi-
nition 2.1.1.
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(P) Particularism = rejection of generalism.
(PP) Principled Particularism = rejection of generalism and acceptance of the
schema of principled approach as presented in the definition 2.1.2.
Consequently, particularism is incompatible with generalism and principled particu-
larism is a special sort of particularism. The three doctrines that we have described
in the previous definition are the most essential ones for our purposes. However, we
will every now and then deal with different versions of particularism as well. These
different versions include but are not limited to the views that deny the existence
of true moral principles, are sceptic towards true moral principles and question the
importance of principles for moral thinking. We will call the family of such doctrines
loosely by extreme particularism. This level of precision is enough for us, since we
are not defending nor primarily attacking against any of those views.
Our goal in this thesis is the same as Holton’s in [5]. That is, to defend principled
particularism as stated in the previous definition. Intuitively, principled particu-
larism claims that all of ethics cannot be captured with a fixed and finite set of
principles. Hence even principled particularism is a radical doctrine. If it is true,
then all the traditional moral theories including those by notable philosophers like
Kant, Mill and Hare are far too ambitious in their scope. Another remark, how-
ever, builds also some common ground for principled particularism and generalism.
A philosopher may be more attracted to generalism than particularism. Neverthe-
less, he may not be convinced by any of the current generalist theories. For such a
philosopher, the principled approach might be a temporary method of learning more
about morality. He would forget the ultimate goal of giving his first principle(s) mo-
mentarily, and work his way towards them by studying the principles which apply
only to some subset of possible acts. In this way, he can admit that the whole of
morality is not yet discovered, but he can learn about the whole by weakening his
goals momentarily. We, however, think that there are no such first principles to be
found for morality.
So our main thesis in this essay is that the correct approach to morality is that of
principled particularism. This claim is defended by offering a viable and detailed ac-
count, which represents principled particularism. Thus our main argument in favour
of principled particularism is abductive - our approach can handle the complexity
found in morality better than generalism or extreme particularism, which is espe-
cially vulnerable to many powerful arguments. The detailed treatment of our own
account will be postponed to the final chapters of this thesis. Before that we will
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focus on the formal features of default reasoning, which will be in key role in our
approach. After that, we will explore many rival theories for principled particular-
ism. These theories are all generalist and they are based on defeasible generalizations
which are built on some kind of ceteribus paribus clauses or default principles. After
this negative part we will focus on our own account. We will now end this chapter
with a subsection that is devoted to Holton’s principled particularism. Moreover,
we will explain how we will develop his approach further.
2.2 Holton’s Principled Particularism
As we have emphasized before, moral principles have traditionally had at least two
roles. They enable us to determine what is right and what is wrong. On the other
hand, they are supposed to be explanatory - principles tell us why some act is
right or wrong. Holton distinguihes these two roles in [5] on pages 3-4 by calling
the first one as investigative role. The other one is the justificatory role. Holton
remarks that particularism is usually accused of lacking these both important roles
(p.4 [5]). His intention is to show that principled particularism can produce a viable
account, in which principles have the justificatory role. He claims that in principled
particularism, principles cannot have the investigative role. The reason for this being
that we can never know before hand which principle should be used. Recall that
in this approach the situation determines the principle and not vice versa. Thus he
thinks that it is a built-in feature in principled particularism that principles do not
guide our decicions in new situations, but they can justify our moral evaluations once
they are made. We disagree with Holton when it comes to investigative role, but
we agree with the part concerning the justificatory role. In our approach, certain
default reasons guide our way between different moral situations. They serve as
investigative “principles”. Obviously, they are not principles as generally understood
since otherwise we would have generalism. Default reasons function merely as default
inclinations that we have towards new situations. We have at least some guidance
for what to look for in a novel case. However, it is not possible to code default
reasons and their interactions in a finite set of principles, which would entail all
moral verdicts. Instead, default reasons have infinitely many possible interactions
and thus we can only know the moral evaluation once we are exposed to a particular
case. The key idea is that in a particular case we can draw the conclusion that the
case has this and that morally relevant featues, but nothing more. Should there be
some further features, they would possibly affect the interaction of default reasons.
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The investigative role of default reasons is exactly the aspect in which our approach
is developed further than in Holton’s. We see it as a great disadvantage in Holton’s
view that there is no information how to evaluate cases which are different, but
almost the same as some case which is given a moral verdict. There is simply
nothing telling us how to judge the new case given our judgement about the similar
but slightly different case. We will much later describe in details how we can avoid
this problem in a plausible way. However, next we will describe how principles play
the justificatory role in Holton’s account.
Holton assumes the holism of reasons. He uses the term supersession for this phe-
nomenom (p.4 [5]). He recognizes that any principle like "if something is a killing,
you should not do it" can be superseded by further principle like "if something is a
killing and done in self defence, you may do it". However, as a principled particular-
ist his intention is to give principles, which work correctly in some particular cases
regardless of the possibility of being superseded in other cases. In order to be able
to draw a moral conclusion in particular cases, he obviously has to assume that no
further features are present, which would alter the moral verdict. For this purpose
he formulates certain "That’s it" condition. It is defined as:
That’s it :
There are no further relevant moral principles and non-moral facts; i.e. there is
no true moral principle and set of true non-moral sentences which supersede those
which appear in this argument. (p.6 in [5])
Furthermore, with the help of the "That’s it" condition he can formulate moral
arguments like:
P1 This is a killing.
P2 ∀x ((x is a killing ∧ That’s it) → you shouldn’t do x)
P3 That’s it
C You shouldn’t do this. (p.6 in [5])
We think Holton has gotten things right here. With the help of such arguments
he can justify particular moral verdicts. Obviously the "That’s it" assumption is
crucial. He admits that further features might affect the judgement, but at the same
time emphasizes his intention in a very straightforward manner:
"So what? Why be worried by hypotheticals? If there were these other features
they would make the action not right. But there aren’t. We are concerned with the
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features that actually do obtain, and they, together with the principles, make the
action right." (p.5 in [5])
Keeping the above words in mind, we grant that Holton has succeeded in his goal to
formulate principles which apply to the cases that are specified in the argument of
which the principle is a part of. Assuming there are no further features present, it
is not reasonable to consider some hypotheticals. However, we think that Holton’s
account is not enough for ethics. Again, this is not criticism towards his work, since
he makes it clear that he merely outlines the possibility of principled particularism
by developing the arguments containing "That’s it" condition. We will soon explain
what Holton’s approach is lacking, but first we present some criticism that other
authors have given for "That’s it" clauses.
Holton’s account has been criticized by Mckeever and Ridge. In appendix "That’s
It" on page 224 in [13], the authors claim that Holton’s arguments do not, after all,
work correctly. Their first argument consists of the idea of adding some irrelevant
fact like "Bees make honey" to the antecedent of premise P2. Omitting many details,
their idea is that by doing so they can falsify the "That’s it" part in P2 and construct
an absurd principle about killing which is superseded by a principle which applies
to cases of "killing and bees making honey". However, Holton himself recognizes
a similar problem on page 8 in [5]. He can, nevertheless, avoid this problem by
requiring that moral principles should be explanatory and minimal in content (p.
10 in [5]). We think that this assumption is plausible and enough to avoid the
problem rising from irrelevant facts.
The other problem that Mckeever and Ridge point out in [13] is that a moral verdict
can be overdetermined by the descriptive features of situation. An example of such a
case can be found on page 225 in [13]: If x is a lie and x would hurt someone’s feelings
and That’s it, then x is wrong. Again, in a rather technical but justified way, they
can formulate absurd principles about lying and hurting someone’s feelings, when
these features are present alone. However, even in this case, the absurd principles
can only appear in an unsound argument of the form P1,P2,P3,C. That is, arguments
which are actually superseded and hence are not used in arriving to a moral verdict.
Thus we think that this criticism is towards Holton is unjustified.
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2.3 Developing Holton’s Account
In this thesis we will present an alternative account which represents principled par-
ticularism. Especially we will describe a view in which default reasons will play also
investigative role. This, we think, is a crucial aspect. Recall that in Holton’s theory,
principles only had the justificatory role. In the following we try to emphasize how
weak a theory of principled particularism will be, if it only has the justificatory role
for principles. Supervenience tells us that cases which are descriptively identical will
have identical moral evaluations. Holton’s principled particularism entails another
kind of supervenience, but not much more. Moral evaluations supervene on morally
relevant descriptive features i.e. situations which are identical in morally relevant
features will have identical moral evaluations. Holton’s approach does not give any
guidance on how some case is judged when further relevant features are present. His
principles only specify that if an act has this and that morally relevant features and
nothing more, then it has some evaluation.
There is another important deficit in Holton’s theory. It does not give any decision
procedure on how we end up in some moral evaluation in the first place. In other
words, we might ask why the feature of being a killing makes the act wrong? One
could as well construct a similar principle which tells that killing makes the act
right. He does not specify why the intuitively right principle is chosen rather than
the perverse one.
We will try to fix these deficits in the last chapters of this thesis. As said, the
investigatory role will be played by default reasons and their rules of interaction.
They give at any situation a starting point for moral evaluation which can, however,
be defeated. On the other hand certain default rules, that we call foundational,
will take care that we do not end up in perverse picture of morality, where killing
is right etc. Thirdly, we think that even the justificatory role will be fulfilled in a
more explanatory way. In Holton’s account, two similar but in some way different
situations call for two distinct That’s it principles. Moreover, it remains unexplained
why the superseding principle gives a different moral verdict than the one super-
seded. The situations are always treated as a whole - a bunch of features will entail
some evaluation. In our approach one can cut a particular action in different parts,
each contributing to the overall moral verdict. As a matter of fact, Dancy remarks
another weakness in Holton’s theory which is produced by the absence of cutting an
act into different parts. On pages 28-29 in [4], he points out that Holton’s account
cannot explain moral regret. In a situation where we have two opposing reasons to
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act we typically feel some guilty or regret even though we act the way we ought to.
According to Holton, this should not be possible, since for any moral situation there
is only one moral reason to act - the principle specified by the act.
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3 Default logics
In this chapter we develop a formal system for default reasoning. As a starting point
towards our goal, we extend the basic propositional logic with default rules, which
correspond roughly to defeasible generalizations in practical reasoning. For example,
if we know that Tweety is a bird, it is plausible to conclude that Tweety can fly.
However, if we learn that Tweety is a penguin, we have to reject the inference that
it can fly. Here we first applied a default rule that birds can fly and then in the
face of new information rejected the earlier conclusion that Tweety can fly. This
phenomenom of rejecting earlier conclusions distinguishes the logics of our interest
fundamentally from classical propositional logic. Propositional logic is monotonic
with respect to adding new information. More precisely, for any theory T and
propositions A and B, it holds that
If T ` B, then T ∪ {A} ` B.
However, in the context of default logic, the above result does not hold. Therefore
we say that default logic is nonmonotonic. This feature has huge metalogical conse-
quences. Arguably, while truth is the most fundamental concept of classical mono-
tonic logic, the same does not hold with nonmonotonic logics. Instead, the main
focus shifts towards coherence. Because of nonmonotonicity, any already accepted
proposition can be rejected later. Consequently, in the face of new information,
the overall coherence of accepted propositions is more important than the truth of
some particular proposition. After all, by the very property of nonmonotonicity, we
cannot acquire similar completeness theorems binding truth to derivability and vice
versa, as in classical logics. Nonmonotonic logic has a built-in ability to model un-
certainty. Generally speaking, the study of nonmonotonic logics began in the 1980’s
and was motivated by the challenge of modeling practical reasoning and develop
artificial intelligence. At that time several different nonmonotonic formal systems
were studied (see e.g. [15], [11]), which later were seen to have much in common.
Default logic was only one of them and thus default logic should be seen as an in-
stance of nonmonotonic systems, having also has its own spesific features that are
not shared with some nonmonotonic logics. The default logic, that we will focus on,
was introduced by John Horty in [7]. Our treatment of the topic will follow loosely
his presentation. We will give our own examples, but the overall line of thinking is
adopted from his book in question.
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Obviously, our goal is to use Horty’ default logic for moral reasoning. At this point
we want to make two crucial remarks concerning the connection of the logic and
moral thinking. Firstly, one might wonder what is the connection of nonmonotonic
reasoning to morality? Recall that we are assuming the holism of reasons in morality,
which means that a reason can be affected by other features of the context in which
it appears. This assumption creates nonmonotonicity in moral thinking. Violence,
for instance, is by default a moral reason against acting. However, if the violence
is committed for self-defence, it is not (again, by default) a moral reason against
acting. Roughly put, our goal is to present Horty’s system, which can model and
advice us even in complex situations. The system is very general in a good sense. We
can have multiple reasons pointing towards different conclusions. Moreover, we can
have multiple auxiliary features, which have these nonmonotonic effects on reasons.
The other crucial remark concerns the connection of Horty’s system to moral (prin-
cipled) particularism. Let us first consider its relation to moral particularism in
general. Horty dicusses this issue in Chapter 6 in [7]. As a matter of fact, Horty
thinks his default logic for moral reasoning supports generalism(!) (p. 147 in [7]).
The reader can calm down, however, since there is a natural reason for this surpris-
ing fact. The explanation is that he has a different characterization of particularism
and generalism in mind than was given in the previous chapter of this thesis. Horty
compares his default logic to Dancy’s definition of particularism and generalism;
Particularism = The possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend
on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles
Generalism = The very possibility of moral thought and judgement depends on the
provision of a suitable supply of moral principles. (p.73 in [4])
Suppose momentarily that the distinction of generalism and particularism is drawn
as above. In this case, we agree with Horty. Default logic is based on principles
governing the logic itself and thus it represents generalism. Also the approach that
we will develop in this thesis (based on Horty’s default logic) represents generalism
defined this way. In chapter 6 in [7], one of Horty’s main arguments is that the
holism of reasons does not entail particularism (p. 148 in [7]). We could not agree
more with him. Default logic uses principles and succeeds in modelling the holism of
reasons. As we have said before, also McKeever and Ridge have shown that holism
does not entail particularism (p.27-32 in [13]). For these reasons there is nowadays
a consensus on the relation of particularism and holism. Holism does not entail
particularism, but particularism entails holism. In fact, this relation of holism and
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particularism holds also if we use our definition of particularism (Chapter 2).
The most interesting issue is, obviously, the relation of default logic to principled
particularism. We think it is an ideal tool to develop an account representing prin-
cipled particularism. Clearly all of ethics cannot be captured with a finite set of
finite principles, which would contain principles governing the default logic and all
the infinitely many interactions of default reasons and other descriptive features of
possible acts. On the other hand, any given particular moral verdict can be justified
by the logic and the features which happen to be present. Moreover, default reasons
play the investigative role of giving us some guidance to novel situations. We now
how to start evaluating a new case - reasons have default valences. Nevertheless,
default valences can change and thus there is no hope in coding all of this complexity
in finite set of finite principles.
We return to the technical aspects of the topic. Our strategy is to start from a simple
system of default logic, then add more desired features to it and eventually reach
a default logic complex enough to model moral reasoning. We will see that in the
context of ethics the rejection of conclusions, or equivalently the defeating of default
reasons, happens in two different ways. That is, a moral reason can be defeated by
a feature supporting contradictory conclusion or by a feature defeating the reason
itself. These two ways of defeating are known as rebutting and undercutting defeat,
respectively. In our initial system we ignore the concept of undercutting defeat.
However, this is not the only crucial feature that is initially omitted. Before turning
to the formal treatment of the topic, we will explain this other simplification in the
following.
It is natural to think that each default reason has some specific priority compared
to other reasons. In our example, the default reason that penguins cannot fly has
a higher priority than the default reason that birds can fly. This is because the
information about penguins is more spesific than that of birds in general. Thus the
default that penguins cannot fly defeats the default that birds can fly. Even in our
initial default logic, every default reason has some priority. However, we will see
that in reality, the priorities of defaults can change in different context. This is true
because sometimes new information is directly about the reliability or justifiability
of already established default reasons. This phenomenom is postponed in our first
proper system, called Fixed Priority Default Logic, which is defined and studied in
the next section.
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3.1 Default Logic with Fixed Priorities
We introduce an initial system of default logic, which will be extended in many steps.
In this system we extend basic logical system of propositional logic with default
rules. In all the logics that we will develop, the most intuitive interpretation for
the propositions is to think them as the factual information in a situation, whereas
default reasons corresponds to reliable inferences or inferences which are otherwise
justified and which can later be rejected.
Let us start with a familiar system of propositional logic with usual connectives and
> denoting the trivially true proposition. The following definition is a good starting
point as well as a reminder about the axioms and rules of inference of classical
propositional logic.
Definition 3.1.1. Propositional logic, denoted by P , is a logic with the following
features:
1) The set of propositions of P :
- > is a proposition.
- Every proposition symbol p0, p1, .. is a proposition.
- If A is proposition, then ¬A is a proposition.
- If A and B are propositions, then A ⊃ B is a proposition.
2) The axioms of P :
If A, B and C are propositions, then
- (A ⊃ (B ⊃ A)),
- ((¬B ⊃ ¬A) ⊃ (A ⊃ B)),
- (((A ⊃ (B ⊃ C)) ⊃ ((A ⊃ B) ⊃ (A ⊃ C)))
are axioms.
3) Rules of inference for P :
Let S be a set of propositions.
- S ` >,
- If A ∈ S, then S ` A,
- If A is an axiom, then S ` A,
- If S ` A and S ` (A ⊃ B), then S ` B. (Modus ponens)
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Propositional logic is the basis for all our default logics of increasing complexity. In
the first stage we will add a new rule of inference, called default rule. This new rule of
derivation is of the form A→ B, where A and B are propositions. It means roughly
that if one has derived A, then by default, one can derive B. For convenience,
we will in many occasions call default rules just defaults. We will also sometimes
identify a default with its antecedent. This will be useful, since usually a reason for
acting is precisely the antecedent of a default rule. A default rule can be applied
to general cases like ‘birds can fly‘, which is given as Bird(x) → Fly(x), where x
is a variable symbol. We can similarly make a singular rule for a bird Tweety by
replacing the variable symbol with a constant naming Tweety. Thus we get a default
rule Bird(t)→ Fly(t). It means roughly that Tweety can fly.
It is obvious that different default rules have different weights for inference. To
model this phenomenon, we assign each default reason δ a priority, for which we use
the same notation as for the rule itself. For default rules δ and δ‘ we write δ < δ‘,
when δ‘ has a higher priority than δ. For example, if δ stands for ‘Birds can fly‘ and
δ‘ for ‘Penguins cannot fly‘, we have that δ < δ‘. In this case, the priority ordering
stems from the generality of the rules; penguins are a subset of birds. However,
the priority ordering can be obtained from very different sources. For instance, in
a given moral dilemma, one could come to a conclusion that one feature is in this
context more important than another.
So far we dealt only with case where we compare two default rules to each other.
The obvious question is then, that how much formal properties we should demand
for the ordering of these defaults? Maybe in some situations one could even assign
values for defaults and then use the linear ordering of, for instance real numbers, to
assign numerical values to weights of defaults. However, this line of thinking does
not look very promising for even ordinary situations. If one sees a weather forecast
telling that it will not rain today and also sees some quite dark clouds in the sky, it
is impossible to assign exact numerical weights to these sources of information. For
the sake of argument, let us assume that one cannot even decide which one of these
sources of information on weather is more reliable. To allow this possibility, we do
not assume that the ordering < is connected. Put differently, it possible that for
any defaults δ and δ‘, it is neither true that δ < δ‘ nor δ‘ < δ. We also assume that
this priority ordering is irreflexive, which entails that it is never true that δ < δ.
Last minimal assumption of this ordering that we adopt is transitivity. Transitivity
is not only a necessary condition for any binary relation to be an ordering of any
sort, but also intuitively plausible for our goals. If we have a default reason which
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is stronger than another which is itself stronger than a third, it should follow that
the first one is stronger than the third. At this point we are ready to summarize.
By definition, the ordering < is a strict partial ordering on a set of defaults, since
it is irreflexive and transitive. We are now ready to give an initial definition for a
default logic.
Definition 3.1.2 (Default Logic, first approximation). We say that the triplet ∆ =〈W ,D, < 〉 is a fixed priority default theory, where W is a set of propositions, D is
a set of default rules and < is a strict partial order on D. (p.22 in [7])
There is one important deficit in the above definition. It defines a system where
each default rule comes with a priority that is fixed in advance. However, in many
situations, new information is directed straightforwardly to the priorities of already
established defaults. For instance, I have default reason to think that some object
before me is red, if it looks red. Now suppose I take a Drug, which makes some
but not all blue things look red. The most natural way to model this situation
is to introduce a new default, which diminishes the weight of the original default
that things that look red are red. However, for the purpose of presentation, it
is most convenient to postpone this possibility of variying priorities of defaults.
Instead, we answer a question of when it is rational for an agent to use a default
rule or alternatively, which default rules correspond to good moral reasons for acting.
Strictly speaking, we have so far focused only on default rules, not default reasons.
It is the latter sort of defaults which play a role in guiding action. However, there
is a natural connection between the two sorts of defaults. For a reader interested
in the question of how a default rule creates the corresponding default reason, we
advice to take a look on the Chapter 2 in [7].
Intuitively, there are three properties that a default reason has to satisfy to qualify as
a good reason. Firstly, a default has to be triggered. This means that the antecedent
in a default rule has to belong either to the set of propositions in question or appear
in the conclusion of some already established default rule. A concrete example
would be that any default reason giving some information about snakes would not
be triggered in the case of Tweety the bird. On the contrary, if it is known that
Tweety is a bird, the default Bird(t)→ Fly(t) is triggered since its antecedent has
been endorsed. Secondly, a good reason cannot be neither conflicted nor defeated.
It simpler to first explain what we mean by a defeated default. Recall that at
this point we only deal with rebutting defeat and the case of undecutting defeat
is studied later. Intuitively, a default is defeated, if a another default with higher
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priority gives a contradicting conclusion than the one defeated. To continue in rough
terms, a default δ is conflicted, if one has already come to conlusion that P via some
default reasoning and then using δ concludes that ¬P . Let us consider an example
in moral thinking. Suppose someone has been trapped inside an elevator for days
and you happen to hear his call for help. The elevator is old and there is no alarm
system in it. You realize you can save the one inside the elevator by breaking its
door with an emergency axe. Here the default reason to help defeats the default
reason not to destroy other people’s property. You have some reason not to break
the door, but the reason to break it is stronger. Helping has a higher priority.
Let us fix some notation. If δ is a default rule X → Y , then Premise : D → P is a
function from a set of defaults to propositions such that Premise(δ) = X. Likewise,
Conclusion : D → P is a mapping such that Conclusion(δ) = Y .
In the same fashion, if S is a set of defaults, we define two useful sets as
Conclusion(S) = {Conclusion(δ) : δ ∈ S}
and
Premise(S) = {Premise(δ) : δ ∈ S}.
These functions will be helpful in the next section, where we focus on the formal
demands of rationality in default reasoning with fixed priorities. We will also get a
better grip on how the reasoning with defaults works in the first place.
3.2 Default Reasoning with Fixed Priorities
We are ultimately interested in modeling an agent’s default reasoning when deciding
how to act in moral situations. From now on, we will assume that all the reasoning
with defaults is done by some agent. This implies that the concept of a scenario
is of great importance. A scenario is a set of defaults consisting of such defaults
that an agent decides to use in reasoning. More formally, a scenario S based on a
default theory ∆ =
〈W ,D, < 〉 is a subset of D. We will be especially interested in
certain kinds of scenarios. That is, scenarios that contain all and only default reasons
which are rational to endorse. We will call such scenarios proper scenarios. A formal
definition of such scenarios will be given later. Intuitively a proper scenario creates
a belief state that contains all logical consequences of the factual information in a
situation as well as consequences of the default rules which are rational to accept.
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Let Th : P → P be a function from the set of propositions to itself such that
Th(E) = {X : E ` X}.
In other words, for a set of propositions, the operator Th gives the logical closure of
those propositions i.e. the set propositions which are derivable from the original set
of propositions by using the inference rules of propositional logic. We use the same
taxonomy as Horty, and by a belief set of some agent, generated by a scenario S,
we mean the set
ε = Th(W ∪ Conlusion(S)). (p. 23 in[7])
Put differently, it is the set of propositions we get by first extending the background
information with the defaults in a scenario chosen by the agent, and then taking a
logical closure of the union. We will later prove that an ideal belief state an agent
can reach in a default theory will be generated by a scenario, which contains all and
only such defaults that are triggered, but not conflicted nor defeated. We will also
prove that such belief set is consistent if and only if the initial set of propositions is.
Let us now define the concepts of triggering, conflicting and defeating more rigor-
ously. We begin with the concept of triggering.
Definition 3.2.1. Let ∆ =
〈W ,D, < 〉 be a fixed priority default theory and S
some scenario based on this theory. The set of triggered defaults in the context of
S is defined as TriggeredW,D(S) = {δ ∈ D : W ∪ Conclusion(S) ` Premise(δ)}.
(p.25 in [7])
The previous definition and its intuitive meaning should be quite clear. It picks out
default rules which have their antecedents in the underlying set of propositions or
in the set of conlusions of already accepted default rules. Next we take a look at
the concept of conflicting defaults.
Definition 3.2.2. Let ∆ =
〈W ,D, < 〉 be a fixed priority default theory and S some
scenario based on this theory. The set of conflicted defaults in the context of S is
defined as ConflictedW,D(S) = {δ ∈ D : W ∪ Conclusion(S) ` ¬Conclusion(δ)}.
(p.27 in [7])
We take a look on an example of conflicting defaults.
Example 3.2.3. Suppose Jack has two aunts, Mary and Helen. He has promised to
visit both of them during summer. His promise creates a moral reason for him to visit
them. He is a very busy man and has only one possible weekend to visit either of the
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aunts. Both of the aunts would very much appreaciate Jack’s visit, but unfortunately
Jack is not able to visit both, since they live far away from each other. Jack cannot
tell which aunt would appreciate his visit more than the other. Let M= ‘Jack visits
Mary’, andH= ’Jack visits Helen’. Moreover, letMpromise= ’visiting Mary fulfills the
promise made to her’ and Hpromise = ’visiting Helen fulfills the promise made to her’.
Let δ1 = Mpromise →M and δ2 = Hpromise → H be the default reasons to meet Mary
and Helen, because they fulfill the promises made. Now we can model the situation
with a default theory ∆ =
〈W ,D, < 〉, where W = {¬M ∨ ¬H,Mpromise, Hpromise},
D = {δ1, δ2}, and the ordering < is empty. The ordering is empty, because Jack
cannot tell which promise is more important. We emphasized the importance of the
concept of a scenario earlier. At this point, however, the scenario will not play a
big role, since our interest lies momentarily on the concept of conflicting defaults.
We will later return to this example and study the effect different scenarios have.
Suppose now that Jack’s initial scenario is S1 = {δ1, δ2}. It means that Jack has
accepted both of the defaults. By definition, both of the defaults are triggered, since
their premisses belong in W . Thus it is the case that TriggeredW,D(S1) = {δ1, δ2}.
Consequently, again by definition, it holds that Conclusion(S1) = {H,M}. Hence
it is the case that W ∪ Conclusion(S1) = {H,M,¬M ∨ ¬H,Mpromise, Hpromise}.
Furthermore, the following inferences hold
{H,M, (¬M ∨ ¬H),Mpromise, Hpromise} ` ¬M
{H,M, (¬M ∨ ¬H),Mpromise, Hpromise} ` ¬H.
But it is also the case that
¬M = ¬Conclusion(δ1),
¬H = ¬Conclusion(δ2),
which means that ConflictedW,D(S1) = {δ1, δ2}. Thus both of the defaults are
conflicted, as expected. Hence the model seems to give the right answer; Jack is in
a genuine moral dilemma. He cannot decide which aunt he should visit, because he
should equally much visit both of them to fulfill his promises, but he cannot do so.
We now proceed to the concept of defeated default reasons. Let us begin with a
definition.
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Definition 3.2.4. Let ∆ =
〈W ,D, < 〉 be a fixed priority default theory and S
some scenario based on this theory. The set of defeated defaults in the context of S
is defined as the set
DefeatedW,D(S) =
{δ ∈ D : ∃δ‘ ∈ TriggeredW,D(S)
(
δ < δ‘∧W∪{Conclusion(δ‘)} ` ¬Conclusion(δ))}.
(p.29 in [7])
Again, the easiest way to make sense of this definition is to take a look at an example.
Example 3.2.5. Suppose Jack eventually decided to visit Helen after making his
decision based on flipping a coin. Now a year after the visit, the poor guy Jack has
been called on duty to defend his country against a hostile enemy state. The enemy
soldiers are attacking and Jack has found a target, which he thinks he cannot miss.
Before pulling the trigger, however, Jack remembers that it is by deault wrong
to kill a human being. He has also learnt that killing a hostile human being for
defence is acceptable, if otherwise he himself would be killed. Let us fix the following
abbrevations: E = ‘Jack kills enemy’ and J= ‘enemy kills Jack’, W= ’wrong to kill
a human being’ and R = ’right to kill a hostile enemy’. Let δ1 = W → J and
δ2 = R→ E.
The situation can modelled with a default theory ∆ =
〈W ,D, < 〉, where W =
{E ∨ J,¬E ∨ ¬J,W,R}, D = {δ1, δ2}, and the ordering of defaults is δ1 < δ2.
Jack’s initial scenario is S1 = {δ1, δ2}, because he has accepted both of these moral
rules. Next we examine how this default theory advices Jack in his awful situation.
Firstly, both of the default are triggered, because their premisses belong in W . Let
us then look if some of the defaults is defeated. We observe that, by the definition
of defeating, only δ1 can be defeated, because for δ2 there exists no default with a
higher priority. Let us see if δ1 is defeated. It holds that
W ∪ {conclusion(δ2)} = {E ∨ J,¬E ∨ ¬J,W,R,E}.
Moreover, we get that
{E ∨ J,¬E ∨ ¬J,W,R,E} ` ¬J.
But this means that δ1 is indeed defeated, since
¬Conclusion(δ1) = ¬J.
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Again the model seems to give intuitively right outcome. Given our initial assump-
tions, in this exceptional situation of war, Jack should kill the attacking enemy.
Obviously, we did not need the formalism for this conclusion. We knew it already.
However, our point was not here to expose a fancy result. The purpose was to show
how the formalism works with defeating defaults. When it comes to more complex
situations, the formalism works as in this simple case. The point is that the formal-
ism gives us a general line of thinking. No matter how complex the situation, we
still have a principled approach available with the help of this system.
We are now ready to gather the concepts of triggering, conflicting and defeating into
one unifying definition. This definition will define what kind of reasons are good
and justified moral reasons.
Definition 3.2.6. Let ∆ =
〈W ,D, < 〉 be a fixed priority default theory and S a
scenario based on this theory. We say that the defaults belonging to the following
set are Binding in the context of the scenario S. BindingW,D(S) = {δ ∈ D : δ ∈
TriggeredW,D(S), δ /∈ ConflictedW,D(S), δ /∈ DefeatedW,D(S)}. (p.30 in [7])
The idea behind this definition of binding defaults is the following. Firstly, a rational
agent should use all the relevant information available to him in some context.
Therefore a binding default has to be triggered. If a default is not triggered, then it
is not relevant in the context and irrational to use. Secondly, a rational agent cannot
accept mutually incompatible propositions. Therefore we have the condition that
binding defaults cannot be conflicted. The concept of conflicting alone, however,
does not give any advice on which of the defaults should be included in the scenario
in the case of incompatibility. It merely says that one cannot include both of two
conflicting defaults. This observation leads us to the third condition of the previous
definition. A binding default cannot be defeated by some default of the scenario.
This is obvious; a rational agent cannot endorse a default which contradicts an
already accepted default with a higher priority.
Above we focused on the constraints for single defaults in a given context. Note that
if we look at the available defaults more holistically, we observe that the situation
is highly dynamic. If one includes some default in a scenario, then possibly some
default is conflicted or defeated. Furthermore, when one excludes the conflicted or
defeated default from the scenario, a third default should be included etc. This phe-
nomenom leads us naturally to focus more on the scenario as a whole rather than
the acceptability of a single default reason. We are interested in the question of
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what kind of a belief set an ideal reasoner can acquire when dealing with some given
fixed priority default theory. Intuitively, such a belief set should be consistent and
include all the propositions that are deductible with available defaults. Proceeding
now towards this goal, we will define a concept of a stable scenario. A stable sce-
nario intuitively contains all and only rationally acceptable defaults and is thus in
equilibrium; one cannot exclude anything from the scenario, because all the defaults
in it are triggered and relevant. On the other hand, one cannot add anything in it,
since it would create a contradiction either by creating a conflict or defeating some
accepted default. Obviously these properties are not well argued yet, but we will
verify them later. First we need to give a formal definition of Horty’s concept of a
stable scenario.
Definition 3.2.7. Let ∆ =
〈W ,D, < 〉 be a fixed priority default theory and S a
scenario based on ∆. We say that S is a stable scenario, if
S = BindingW,D(S). (p.30 in[7])
As we can see, a stable scenario based on some fixed priority default theory contains
all the binding defaults and only them. Recall that we have earlier spoken about
proper scenarios as the scenarios that an ideal reasoner would adopt. Now the
obvious question is that what is the connection of the stable scenarios to proper
scenarios? Should we identify stable scenarios as proper? After all, stable scenarios
seem like a good candidate to play the role of proper scenarios. They contain all the
good reasons and nothing more. In fact, in all the ordinary cases, stable scenarios
are exactly the same as proper scenarios. According to Horty in [7], there are
some quite technical cases, in which there are stable scenarios that should not be
classified as proper. These situations contains defaults or chains of default which
are self-triggering, as Horty puts it. However, for our purposes it is safe to stipulate
that a scenario is proper if and only if it is stable. From now on, we will speak
of stable and proper scenarios interchangeably. We advice readers interested in the
exceptional cases, where these to concepts do not collide, to take a look at the
Appendix A.1 on page 221 in [7].
At this point some might still have doubts why stable scenarios correspond to proper
ones. These doubts will vanish, however, after we will soon define the concept of an
extension for a fixed priority default theory. An extension will be the ideal belief
set than an agent can acquire by using all the available facts and defaults in a
situation. Therefore it gives the set of propositions that can be rationally derived
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from a default theory. We will see that extensions will be constructed with the help
of a proper (or equivalently; stable) scenarios. Most importantly, extensions will be
consistent and logically closed sets of propositions. Before that we will first take a
look on a few examples to grasp the importance of the concept of a stable scenario.
We return to the examples 3.2.3 and 3.2.5 about Jack’s problem of visiting his aunts
and about Jack’s challenge in the battlefield, respectively. We now have almost all
the tools available to treat the examples in the right spirit of default logic. The final
conclusions about the examples will be acquired after we have defined the concept
of an extension of a default theory, but let us now focus on the question about the
existence of proper scenarios in our earlier examples. We start with the example
about Jack’s problem of visiting his aunts and we will deal with the example about
war after we have defined the concept of extension.
Example 3.2.8. Assume we have a similar situation as in the example 3.2.3 and
use the same notation as in it. Recall that the example was modeled with fixed
priority default theory ∆ =
〈W ,D, < 〉, whereW = {¬M ∨¬H,Mpromise, Hpromise},
D = {δ1, δ2} and the ordering < was empty. Moreover, the defaults were defined as
δ1 = Mpromise → M and δ2 = Hpromise → H. We try to find out if the theory in
question has proper scenarios. There are four different possible scenarios, since there
are two default reasons in the theory. These four scenarios are: S0 = ∅, S1 = {δ1},
S2 = {δ2} and S3 = {δ1, δ2}.
We first examine if the scenario S0 is proper. A proper scenario has to contain
all and only the binding defaults i.e. such defaults that are triggered, but neither
conflicted nor defeated in the context of that scenario. Firstly, we see that the
scenario S0 does not contain any defaults, and thus it cannot fail to be proper by
containing defaults which are not binding. If S0 is not proper, then there has to be
binding defaults in its context which do not belong to S0. Let us see if there are
such binding defaults which would rule out the possibility of S being proper. Recall
that a binding default has to, especially, be triggered in the context. We see that
there are in fact triggered defaults in the context of S0. More precisely, both δ1 and
δ2 are triggered, since
TriggeredW,D(S0) = {δ ∈ D :W ∪ Conclusion(S0) ` Premise(δ)}
= {δ ∈ D :W ` Premise(δ)}
= {δ1, δ2}.
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If we can add either of the triggered defaults, δ1 or δ2, in S0 without them being
neither conflicted nor defeated, we see that S0 is not proper. We first try to include
δ1 in S0 and see if δ1 is conflicted or defeated.
By definition and the fact that S0 = ∅, the set of conflicted defaults in the context
of S0 is given as:
ConflictedW,D(S0) = {δ ∈ D :W ∪ Conclusion(S0) ` ¬Conclusion(δ)}
= {δ ∈ D :W ` ¬Conclusion(δ)}.
Furthermore, since W = {¬M ∨ ¬H,Mpromise, Hpromise}, it holds that
ConflictedW,D(S0) = ∅.
Therefore, especially the triggered default δ1, that we are trying to include in S0, is
not conflicted in the context of S0. We have one more step left. If the default δ1
is not defeated in the context of S0, then it is binding, since we already established
that it is triggered and not conflicted. Moreover, this would entail that the scenario
S0 is not proper, because δ1 would instantiate a binding default reason in the context
of S0, which does not belong in S0. By definition, the set of defeated defaults in the
context of S0 is given as
DefeatedW,D(S0) =
{δ ∈ D : ∃δ‘ ∈ TriggeredW,D(S0)
(
δ < δ‘∧W∪{Conclusion(δ‘)} ` ¬Conclusion(δ))}.
We observe that there are no defeated defaults in the context of S0, because the
ordering < is empty. In other words, DefeatedW,D(S0) = ∅. More essentially, δ1 /∈
∅ and hence we conclude that δ1 is not defeated in the context of scenario S0.
Consequently, it is the case that S0 is not proper. Intuitively, this makes sense.
Ideal reasoning cannot lead Jack to the conclusion that he will not visit either of
the aunts, given the his initial promise to visit both.
Let us then take a look at the other scenarios. We saw already in the example 3.2.3
that the scenario S3 = {δ1, δ2} is not proper, although we did not recognize the
concept at that time. Both of the defaults were conflicted, and thus S3 contained
defaults which are not binding. The intuitive reason for the failure of being proper
in this case is that the set of facts, denoted by W , already excludes the possibility
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of visiting both aunts and therefore a rational agent cannot embrase both of the
defaults. Consequently, we have only scenarios S1 and S2 left. By symmetry, it
is enough to study only the case of S1. The scenario can fail to be proper in two
different ways. That is, by containing defaults which are not binding or by not
containing defaults which are binding. Let us begin with the former.
The scenario S3 contains only the default δ1. It is obviously triggered, since it was
already triggered in the context of S0 and the notion of triggering is monotonic
with respect to adding defaults to a scenario. The default δ1 is not conflicted in the
context of S1, because of two remarks. Firstly, it was not conflicted in the context S0
and secondly, S1 contains only one default which is not in S0, namely δ1. Obviously,
δ1 does not conflict itself. Therefore δ1 is not conflicted in the context of S1. The
case about defeating is similar to the case about S0. Hence we conclude that δ1 is
binding in the context of S1. Moreover, we have accomplished the part showing that
S1 does not contain defaults, which are not binding. The final question is: "Are
there defaults which are binding in the context of S1, which do not belong in S1?"
Put shortly, the answer is no. We already saw earlier that if we include δ2 in S1,
we get conflicted defaults. Our final conlusion is, henceforth, that we have found a
proper scenario. By symmetry, also S2 is proper. The intuitive explanation for this
existence of two proper scenarios is the following. Jack promised to visit both aunts,
but he cannot visit both. Therefore it is rational for him to visit either of them. The
model cannot see a difference between visiting Mary or Helen, because Jack cannot
give priorities to the promises made. In this kind of case, both S1 and S2 are proper
scenarios, and Jack has to decide on arbitrary gorunds which of the corresponding
defaults he accepts while making it irrational to accept the other default that he did
not initially accept.
Now that we have a good grasp about the dynamic nature of scenarios and their
acceptability, we are ready to proceed towards defining the fundamental concept
of extension. Extension will be the set propositions that is rational to endorse by
rationally using the factual information and the defaults in a given context. We
begin with a definition given by Horty, and then study all the great properties that
an extension has.
Definition 3.2.9 (Extensions of a Fixed Priority Default Theory). Let ∆ =
〈W ,D, <〉
be a fixed priority default theory. We say that a belief set E is an extension of the
theory, if for some proper scenario S based on ∆, it holds that
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E = Th(W ∪ Conclusion(S)). (p. 33 in[7])
As we hinted earlier, an extension is the ideal belief set that an agent can acquire
with the help of a default theory. Put roughly, an extension contains all propositions
that can be inferred (logical closure) and nothing that cannot be rationally inferred
(consistency). The property of logical closure is easy to verify. A set of propositions
W is closed under ordinary logical consequence if the following holds:
For any proposition X : If W ` X, then X ∈ W .
In the case of extensions, we get directly from the definitions that
E = Th(W ∪ Conclusion(S)) = {X :W ∪ Conclusion(S) ` X},
which shows that extensions are indeed closed under logical consequence. The prop-
erty of consistency a bit more complicated. However, the following theorem (see p.
33-34 in [7]) tells us that one cannot end up in an inconsistent belief set by using
defaults correctly, if the background information is consistent.
Theorem 3.2.10. Let E be an extension of a fixed priority default theory ∆ =〈W ,D, < 〉. The extension E is consistent if and only if the set of propositions W
is consistent.
Proof. We give a proof, which is slightly different than Horty’s, but the overall idea
is the same as in [7](p.33-34). Assume first that E is consistent. It is obvious that if
a set of propositions is consistent then so are all of its subsets. The following chain
of subset relations holds:
E = Th(W ∪ Conclusion(S))
= {X :W ∪ Conclusion(S) ` X} ⊇ W ∪ Conclusion(S) ⊇ W .
Consequently, W is consistent.
For the other direction, we use the law of contraposition. Assume that E is in-
consistent. This means that for any proposition x, E ` x and E ` ¬x. Fur-
thermore, since E is closed under logical consequence, it holds for all propositions
x that x ∈ E and ¬x ∈ E . Let S be a proper scenario based on ∆. Recall
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that E = {X : W ∪ Conclusion(S) ` X}. Thus W ∪ Conclusion(S) ` x and
W ∪ Conclusion(S) ` ¬x, for any proposition x.
We first show that the proper scenario S has to be empty. Towards a contra-
diction, assume that S 6= ∅. Hence there exists a default δ = Premise(δ) →
Conclusion(δ) such that δ ∈ S. However, we noted that W ∪ Conclusion(S) en-
tails every proposition and thus especiallyW∪Conclusion(S) ` Conclusion(δ) and
W ∪Conclusion(S) ` ¬Conclusion(δ). But this means that δ is conflicted. There-
fore we have a contradiction, since S was assumed to proper and proper scenarios
do not contain conflicted defaults. Thus we conclude that S = ∅.
Since S = ∅, we have that W ∪ Conclusion(S) = W . This, however, implies that
for any proposition x, W ` x and W ` ¬x, which means that W is inconsistent.
We end this section by taking a concrete look on a particular fixed priority default
theory and the extension(s) that it produces. First, however, we make a remark on
the number of extensions that a fixed priority default theory can produce. All three
of the following options are possible. There are theories with no extensions, theories
with a unique extension and also theories with multiple extensions.
Theories without extensions have a philosophical interest of their own, but for our
purposes they are not very interesting. In short, they are theories that produce
vicious loops for the reasoning agent. For example and omitting many details, a
theory with two defaults, δ1 = > → A and δ2 = A → ¬A, where δ1 < δ2, is an
example of theory without extensions (p.38 in [7]). Initially, empty scenario cannot
be proper, since δ1 is triggered and not conflicted nor defeated. But once it is
accepted δ2 becomes triggered. Then, in the context of scenario {δ1}, δ2 is triggered
and δ1 becomes defeated by δ2. Also the scenario {δ2} is not proper, since δ2 is not
triggered. Finally, {δ1, δ2} is not proper, since both of the defaults are conflicted.
Theories without extensions can be described incoherent as Horty puts it in [7].
When it comes to theories with multiple extensions, we already saw an example
of such a case. Recall that in the example 3.2.8, Jack had two proper scenarios
- one corresponding to visiting Mary, and the other one corresponding to visiting
Helen. The formal framework of fixed priority default theory does not itself take
any stand on how two understand such possibility. Therefore there are at least
three different options to interprete such a situation (see p.34-37 in [7]). First
one is the choice option. Put roughly, in this option the agent can choose on
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whatever grounds which extension she accepts as the "right" one. Secondly, there
is the credulous option. In this approach the extensions give belief sets which are
rationally believable and no choice between them is made. The third option is the
most popular. In the proposition intersection alternative, the agent should refrain
from making judgements about propositions that are treated differently in different
extensions. Therefore she should treat only propositions that belong to all of the
extensions as acceptable conclusions of the theory. In our approach, the first two
options are the best candidates. It is reasonable, that Jack can choose between
visiting Helen or Mary and that Jack can hold both of the alternatives coherent.
However, it would be strange for him not to accept either of the scenarios as the
proposition intersection alternative suggests.
Last but not least, there are theories with unique extensions. We now take a look
on such a situation.
Example 3.2.11. Consider the example 3.2.5. We use the same notation as in it.
At this point it should be fairly clear that the only proper scenario in that example
is the scenario S = {δ2}. That is, the scenario which advices Jack to kill the hostile
enemy. By definition, the extension of that fixed priority default theory is the set
E = Th(W∪Conclusion(S)) = Th({E∨J,¬E∨¬J,W,R}∪{E}) = {E,¬J,W,R}.
In the next subsection we enrich the fixed priorities approach with priorities varying
between different contexts. With the help of this possibility, we can eventually model
the undercutting defeat of defaults, which is crucial when this formality is applied
to moral thinking.
3.3 Default Logic with Variable Priorities
In our particularist framework for morality, we grant that sometimes morally rele-
vant features can defeat a reason for acting in two ways. The first way of defeating
could already be modelled in fixed priority default theory. A reason is defeated by
rebutting when a feature with a higher priority gives an incompatible conclusion.
For instance, suppose you have promised to have a dinner with your friend and
then suddendly remember that you have a crucial work meeting at the same time.
Assume that the dinner could easily be arranged the day after the meeting. The
reason to go to the work meeting has naturally higher priority than that of going
for a dinner. Now the latter is defeated by rebutting, since there is a reason with
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higher priority advicing not to have the dinner. The other way of defeating, known
as undercutting defeat, could not be modeled in the fixed priority framework. An
example of the undercutting defeat goes as follows. Suppose a murderer struggles
with using his weapon. Although we can assume that we have a moral default rea-
son to help people when we easily can, obviously one should not help the murderer.
In this situation, the fact that the object of help is a murderer defeats the duty of
helping people entirely. The case is not so that you have some reason to help the
murderer and stronger reason not to help him. The reason to help is no longer any
moral reason to act. This is what undercutting defeating is all about. In the case
of choosing between dinner and work meeting, the theoretical picture was different.
In that case you still have some reason to go for a dinner, but the reason to go to
the meeting is stronger. In this latter case of helping a murderer, the other reason
itself is defeated rather than outweighted by the opposite reason.
We now proceed to developing a formal framework rich enough to model this phe-
nomenom of undercutting defeat. However, before introducing the concept of under-
cutting, we will make another adjustement. We do not anymore assume a priority
relation of defaults, which is fixed in advance. The fact that we allow varying prior-
ities will have some effect on many of the key concepts of the previous subsection.
Nevertheless, fixed priority default theory provides a good starting point to develop
the more complex logic with varying priorities. Intuitively, varying priorities allow
us to model intensifiers and diminishers. Recall that intensifier is a feature which
does not change the polarity of a reason, but makes the reason stronger. In our
terminology, intensifier makes a default reason’s priority higher. On the other hand,
a diminisher is a feature which lowers the reason-giving power of another feature.
For example, if you see someone in danger, it creates a moral reason to help the
one in danger. Moreover, suppose that the one in danger is someone close to you,
perhaps a friend or a family member. It is natural to analyze this situation with
the help varying priorities and intensifiers. The fact that someone is in danger is a
moral default reason to help him. Furthermore, the fact that he is someone special
to you makes its status as a reason even greater. Put differently, the special close
relation to the one in danger is an intensifier for the reason to help, but not in this
case a reason in itself. Obviously, in some complex situations it can be hard to
identify which feature is an intensifier or diminisher for some default. But when
we can identify some particular feature we say that, for instance, the feature f is a
diminisher for a default δ. Later on, we will return to a similar case and see how we
can model an intensifier with a variable priority default theory.
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One can divide our task of modelling the undercutting defeating in three different
parts. Firstly, we will work towards giving a definition of a variable priority default
theory. Secondly, we will add a new predicate “Out”, to this variable priority theory.
This new predicate will correspond to undercutting defeat. Thirdly and finally, we
will make some adjustements to the key concepts introduced earlier. Most impor-
tantly, the notion of triggered defaults has to be modified to work properly with
variable priorities and undercutting. Let us now start the first phase of our task.
We will add new individual constants to our formal language. By dx, we mean the
name of a default δx. Moreover, we will add to our language a new binary realation
symbol ≺, which will correspond to the priority ordering of defaults. With the help
of these modifications, we can have defaults of new form. Horty gives an example
of such novel defaults on page 113 in [7]. In his example, there are three default
reasons: δ1 = X → Y, δ2 = Z → ¬Y and δ3 = > → d1 ≺ d2. In this situation
defaults δ1 and δ2 give incompatible conclusions. However, the default δ3 tells us
that δ2 has a higher priority than δ1. Assume that this is all that we know and both
of the default δ1 and δ2 are triggered. In this situation we should reason according to
δ2. However, as Horty points out, the default δ3 could be defeated by an additional
feature, which would obviously alter the priorities of δ1 and δ2 also.
Recall that fixed priority default theories were tuples of the form ∆ =
〈W ,D, < 〉.
Now that our priorities will vary in different situations, we replace the form of the
structure to simply ∆ =
〈W ,D〉. In other words, there is no priority ordering
of the defaults in D, which is fixed in advance. In the case before us, both the
factual propositions in W and the defaults in D may contain information about the
priorities of defaults. Thus the priorities will vary, depending on the scenario i.e.
the default reasons that a reasoning agent has endorsed. This is the basic idea of a
variable priority default theory. Now that we allow variable priorities and erased the
ordering < from the definition of ∆, we will codify the different priority orderings
inside W . More precisely, we assume that the set of propositions W contains all
the possible instances of partial orderings of defaults in D. That is, W contains all
possible occurrences of ¬d ≺ d and (d ≺ d′ ∧ d′ ≺ d′′) ⊃ d ≺ d′′, where the variables
refer to the names of the defaults in D.
We are now ready to give an initial definition of a variable priorities default theory.
At this point we omit the phenomem of undercutting.
Definition 3.3.1. We say that the pair ∆ =
〈W ,D〉 is a variable priority default
theory, whereW is a set of ordinary propositions andD is a set of defaults. Moreover,
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every default δx ∈ D has a unique name dx and W contains every possible partial
ordering, where variables are replaced with names of defaults belonging to D. (p.113
in [7])
The idea behind including all the possible orderings of defaults inW is the following.
Priorities of defaults are always relative to some context, which in our approach
means that they are relative to the scenario in which the reasoning agent happens
to be in. Recall that scenario is just some subset of D i.e. a set of defaults that the
agent has endorsed. The formal mirror image of this idea is acquired by relativizing
the ordering with respect to some scenario. In other words, we define that a default
δ1 has lower priority than a default δ2 according to the scenario S if it is the case
that δ1 <S δ2. What we really mean with this notation is explained in the following
definition.
Definition 3.3.2. Let ∆ =
〈W ,D〉 be a variable priority theory and S a scenario
based on this theory. The priority relation <S in the context of the scenario S is
defined as
δ1 <S δ2 if and only if W∪Conclusion(S) ` d1 ≺ d2, where δ1, δ2 ∈ D. (p.114 in [7])
Intuitively, the previous definition tells that the default δ2 has a higher priority than
the default δ1 if the following holds: the propositional information of W together
with the conclusions of defaults of the scenario inmply that d1 ≺ d2. In fixed priority
theories it was fixed in advance whether a default has a higher priority than another
one, but here also the defaults themselves have an effect on the priority ordering.
In the previous section we saw the importance of the concept of a scenario and
especially the concept of a proper scenario. We can observe that the definition of
a proper scenario in fixed priority theories uses the priority relation. Consequently,
we face a problem. How can we define proper scenarios for variable priority theories,
when there is no fixed relation of priorities available? Luckily, the answer is very
simple. We can take advantage of the corresponding definition for fixed priority
theories. We just say that a scenario S is proper in variable priority default theory,
if the corresponding scenario is proper in the fixed priority default theory, which
is constructed with the help of the ordering in the context of S. The following
definition will make the idea clear and explicit.
Definition 3.3.3. Let ∆ =
〈W ,D〉 be a variable priority theory and S a scenario
based on this theory. We say that the scenario S is a proper scenario based on the
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theory ∆ if and only if S is a proper scenario based on the fixed priority default
theory
〈W ,D, <S 〉, where <S is the priority relation determined by the context of
the scenario S. (p.114 in [7])
This definition completes our framework of variable priority theories. Before intro-
ducing the concept of undercutting defeat it is useful to take a look at an example.
By doing so we get a concrete situation and see how scenarios determine the priority
relations of defaults.
Example 3.3.4. Assume we are facing a situation described as follows. Jack is in a
hurry and on his way to work, when he notices that an old person needs help to get
back on her feet after falling to ground accidentally. Jack has two opposite thoughts.
He would like to get work on time to fulfill his promise to his employer, but on the
other hand he feels that he should help the old person. Assume that Jack thinks
that all things considered, he should help the old person, eventhough he will be late
from work. Finally, let us assume another feature in the situation. Jack observes
that another person, also quite old, is intending to help the one struggling on the
ground. At this point, he feels minor guilt, but decides to ignore the situation and
continue his way to work. He thinks that althought he would have been helpful for
the old person who slipped, they can barely handle the situation without his help.
Having illustrated the case, we can model it as follows.
Let N = “Old person needs help”, S = “someone is already helping the person”, H =
“Jack helps the person”, and ¬H = “Jack continues his way to work to be there on
time and fulfill his promise”. Now the propositional information of the situation is
W = {N,S}. When it comes to the set D, it contains three defaults. Firstly, we
have a default δ1 = > → ¬H, describing the fact that Jack should, by default, be at
work on time, since he has promised so. Secondly, we have a default δ2 = N → H
illustrating the default reason to help when someone needs it. Finally, we a have
a default δ3 = S → d2 ≺ d1, which tells us that when there is someone already
helping the person, Jack’s default reason to get to work gets a higher priority than
the default reason to help the one in trouble. We can assume that in the context
of the scenarios, in which δ3 is absent, it is the case that δ1 < δ2. This means that
when someone is in trouble, it is more important to help her than to get to work on
time. This is everything we assume about the priority relations of the case before
us.
Let us now start to search for Jack’s proper scenarios. We remark that all of the
three default are triggered, since Premise(δi) ∈ W for i = 1, 2, 3. Consequently, it
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is natural to first examine if the scenario S1 = D = {δ1, δ2, δ3} is proper. In the
context of this scenario it holds that
W ∪ Conclusion(S1) = {N,S,¬H,H, d2 ≺ d1}.
We observe that S1 cannot be proper, since it contains defaults that are con-
flicted. These conflicted defaults are δ1 and δ2, because Conclusion(δ1) = ¬H and
Conclusion(δ2) = H. Thus we have two options for fixing this problem. We can
remove either δ1 or δ2 from the scenario. Which one, however, should we remove?
We observe that in the context of this scenario S1 the default δ3 = S → d2 ≺ d1
belongs in S1, which implies that
W ∪ Conclusion(S1) ` d2 ≺ d1.
Furthermore, by definition 3.3.2, this is equivalently written as
δ2 <S1 δ1.
Hence it is wiser to remove the default δ2 from the scenario, since in the context of
S1 as well as S2 = {δ1, δ3}, the default δ1 has a higher priority than δ2.
Having made these observations, we can now study if the scenario S2 is proper. As
always, there are two separate parts to check - that all the defaults belonging in the
scenario are binding in its context and that all of the binding defaults in the context
of the scenario belong in the scenario. We first verify that δ1 and δ3 are binding
in the context of S2. It is clear that both of them are triggered. Since δ2 does not
belong in S2, the default δ1 is no more conflicted (this is easy to verify with the help
of the definition 3.2.2). It is also obvious that the default δ3 cannot be conflicted,
because in D there exists no other default with a conclusion stating anything about
the priority relations. The same argument shows that δ3 cannot be defeated. We
show that δ2 is not defeated in a more detailed manner in order to recall and get
more comfortable with the concepts we have used along the way.
The potential defeater for the default δ2 is, of course, the default δ1. Recall that, by
definition 3.2.4, there are three conditions that has to be satisfied when a default is
defeated. Firstly, the defeater has to be triggered in the context of S2. This condition
actually holds; the default δ2 is triggered in the context of S2 even though it does not
belong in the scenario. It is triggered because its premise belongs in W . Moreover,
the third condition of the definition 3.2.4 holds. By this third condition we mean
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that the set of propositions W together with the defeater entails an incompatible
conclusion than the default which is defeated. It is the case that
W ∪ {Conclusion(δ2)} = {N,S,H} ` ¬Conclusion(δ1) = ¬¬H = H.
Hence we conclude that the potential defeater δ2 does indeed entail the conclusion
which is incompatible with the conclusion of the default δ1. However, the last
condition in the definition 3.2.4 about the priority relation of the defeater and the
one defeated is crucial. Recall that in the context of the scenario S2, the relevant
priority relation is the ordering <S2 . Furthermore, in the context of S2, the priority
ordering of δ1 and δ2 is reversed (by the the default δ3). Put differently, in the
ordering <S2 , it holds that the potential defeater δ2 has lower priority than δ1. Thus
we conclude that δ1 is not defeated in the context of S2. Moreover, this completes
the argument showing that both δ1 and δ3 are binding in the context of S2. On
the other hand, δ2 is not binding in this context (since it is defeated by δ1, which is
easy to verify). Consequently, the scenario S2 is proper. This scenario advices Jack
retain from helping and continue his way to work. Given our assumptions about
Jack’s situation this is in agreement with our earlier intuitive reasoning. We leave
it as an exercise to verify that there are no other proper scenarios.
Now that we are familiar with a concrete example which is most conveniently mod-
elled with the help of variable priorities, we are ready to proceed to another form of
defeating. In the next section we stude the concept of undercutting defeat.
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3.4 Default Logic and Undercutting
We have earlier explained what we mean by undercutting defeat and at this point
our challenge is model it formally. Towards this goal we introduce a new predicate
to our formal language. This new predicate is denoted as Out(d), where d is a
name of a default reason δ. Now Out(d) means that the default δ is undercut and
should no more be used by the reasoning agent. For example, suppose an agent has
accepted two default rules δ1 = X → Y and δ2 = Z → ¬Y , which have the same
priority (in the context of her current scenario). She then accepts a third default
rule δ3 = X → Out(d2). The latest default rule advices to undercut the the second
one and hence with the help of the third default she can draw the conclusion Y ,
since the default δ2 with the incompatible conclusion plays no longer any role in the
reasoning. By adding this new predicate to the variable priority default theory, we
get a definition for a more complex theory.
Definition 3.4.1. A variable priority default theory with undercutting is a variable
priority default theory, where the background language contains the predicate Out.
(p.124 in [7])
In fact, undercutting could also be introduced to fixed priority default theories.
However, since variable priority approach is more general than the former, we are
mainly interested in theories with variable priorities and undercutting. We already
have an intuitive picture of what it means for a default to be undercut. This new
feature will have crucial effect on the concept of good moral default reason, which
agent should use. Furthermore, it will have an effect on which scenarios count as
proper and which do not. Let us now define what we mean by undercutting a
default.
Definition 3.4.2. Let ∆ =
〈W ,D〉 be a variable priority default theory with un-
dercutting and S a scenario based on this theory. The set of undercut defaults in
the context of S, denoted by UndercutS , is defined as
δ ∈ UndercutS if and only if W ∪ Conclusion(S) ` Out(d).
(p.124 in [7])
So a default δ is undercut, if the background set of propositions W together with
the defaults of the scenario entail the statement Out(d), where d is the name of
δ. In many cases there is some particular default rule δX , which has Out(dY ) as
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its conclusion. In such case, we say that δ2 is undercut by δ1 or that δ1 is an
(undercutting) defeater for δ2. Obviously, we want to adjust the set of binding
reasons so that no reason, which is undercut, can be binding. Luckily there is an
easy way of doing it. It is enough to revise the definition of a triggered default
reason.
Definition 3.4.3. Let ∆ =
〈W ,D〉 be a variable priority default theory with un-
dercutting and S a scenario based on this theory. The set of triggered defaults in
the context of S is defined as:
TriggeredW,D(S) = {δ ∈ D : δ /∈ UndecutS ∧W ∪ Conclusion(S) ` Premise(δ)}.
(p.125 in [7])
Because of the previous definition, we do not have to adjust the definition of binding
defaults at all. Furthermore, since proper scenarios were defined with the help of
binding defaults, the characterization of them remains valid. We end this subsection
by giving a brief example showing how the undercutting defeat actually works.
Example 3.4.4. Let us return to the case of helping a murderer. Someone might
consider this example illustrating a quite silly case. However, our purpose is to
study an important formal feature, as in other examples, rather than describing a
fancy and morally surprising situation. Moreover, the system will work similarly
in such situations. So assume we have two defaults corresponding to the default
reason to help other people and the other one corresponding to the fact that the
object of help is a murderer. Let H = “I help this person”, and M= “the person
is a murderer”. We can write the defaults as δ1 = > → H and M → Out(d1).
The set of factual information in the situation is just W = {M}. Thus the only
proposition in the background information is that the person is a murderer. We
can assume that the priority relation is fixed, since in this example there are no
diminishers present. In fact we can assume that the priority relation is empty;
neither of the defaults has a higher priority than the other. We have four possible
scenarios: S0 = ∅,S1 = {δ1},S2 = {δ2} and S3 = {δ1, δ2}. Let us examine if there
are any proper scenarios in this situation. In any of the scenarios, both of the
defaults are potentially triggered. This is true, since the premise of the default δ1
is entailed by any set of propositions and the premise of the default δ2 belongs in
the set W . By saying potentially triggered we emphasize the fact that, in a default
theory where the concepts of undercutting is present, no default which is undercut
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can be triggered. We observe immediately, that the scenario S3 cannot be proper.
This is verified by the following argument. It holds that
W ∪ Conclusion(S) = {M,H,Out(d)}, and {M,H,Out(d)} ` Out(d).
Thus by the definition of undercutting, the default δ1 is undercut. Consequently, δ1
is not triggered and hence S3 is not proper because it contains a default which is
not triggered in its context. Let us then consider the scenario S2. By the previous
argument, the default δ1 is not triggered even in the context of S2, since it contains
the undercutter δ2. Thus S2 cannot fail to be a proper scenario by not containing
defaults which are binding. Hence it is enough to consider if the default δ2 is
binding in the context of S2. Clearly it is triggered, because its premise belongs in
W and there are no undercutters present for δ2. In addition, δ2 is not conflicted nor
defeated and hence it is indeed binding. We conclude that the scenario S2 is proper.
Intuitively, it tells us that one should not help the murderer. It remains to decide
whether the scenarios S0 and S1 are proper. Firstly, S0 is not proper, since it does
not contain the default δ2, which is easily seen to be binding in the context of S0.
On the other hand, S1 is not proper since it contains a default which is undercut
and hence not triggered nor binding. This can be verified with a similar argument
that we already made. To conclude, the unique proper scenario in this situation is
the scenario S2, which does not contain the conclusion of helping the murderer.
3.5 Chapter Summary and Discussion
We have now completed our formal framework for default reasoning. This formal
approach will later guide our informal and more philosophical approach on con-
structing a view on morality, which represents principled particularism. Obviously
the approach discussed in this chapter is somewhat idealized. A real life moral rea-
soner will not determine his stable scenarios and extensions to reach a conclusion.
However, what we have described creates a standard for good reasoning. On the
other hand, we are not alone when accused of idealized picture far from reality. For
utilitarism, the calculation of utilities is even more idealized; the account does not
even give a standard how utilities are calculated. We know the right thing to do
in simple mundaine moral cases without any appeal to philosophical thinking. It is
the hard and complex cases in which we need guidance. Our approach could work
in such a situation, where we have plenty of time to form a judgement. Moreover,
in the future default logic could be a promising tool for developing morality for
artificial intelligence.
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To summarize, we have modelled formally many of the key ways in which pro tanto
reasons interact with each other and the rest of the morally relevant features of a
situation. These key concepts are conflicting reasons, rebutting defeat, diminishers,
intensifiers and undercutting defeat. These concepts and the ways that they affect
moral evaluations are, in our view, essentially everything that is needed in moral
reasoning. However, there is more work to be done in the area of “theory of reasons”
as one could call this formal approach. We now discuss several topics that were
omitted or topics which might be problematic and should be studied further. All
of these topics are such that we would have wanted to include them in this thesis,
but they are also so deep and complex that one could probably write another thesis
concerning them and nothing else.
The first remark concers the notion of rebutting defeat. As Horty points out on
page 193 of [7], it seems that sometimes a default reason can be defeated by a set
of stronger reasons rather than by some particular reason with a higher priority. In
such a situation, the original default is compatible with the stronger defaults when
taken separately, but as a set they are incompatible with the original default. This
kind of situation is also imaginable in the context of morality. As a matter of fact, we
will describe in the next section a situation in which there are two separate reasons
that both are in favour of acting in certain way. However, when taken together, they
favour the opposite way of acting. Perhaps this situation, which is described in the
example 4.3.2, would be best modelled in a theory which allows that a default can
be defeated by a set of defaults.
Another topic that is omitted deals with the connection of variable priorities and
undercutting defeat. More specifially, one could be tempted to reduce the concept
of undercutting into a special case of varying priorities. The idea is to replace the
notion of undercutting by simply diminishing the priority of the undercut default to
zero or another value, which is small enough. At first glance, this would have the
same effect as being undercut. However, Horty realizes on page 131 in [7], that this
suggestion would entail the downward closure of undercutting - any default with a
lower priority than the one that is defeated by undercutting would also be undercut.
This is an unwanted consequence. On page 132 onwards in [7], the problems with
this approach are illustrated in several examples.
Finally, we have also omitted the possibility of a default being undercut by a weaker
default. It is clear that in the case of rebutting defeat a weaker default cannot
defeat a stronger default. However, in the case of undercutting, the defeating reason
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is in a sense pointed towards the justification of the reason that is potentially being
defeated. An example from the epistemic domain, in which it could be plausible
to allow undercutting by weaker default, goes as follows: Suppose person A claims
that P . On the other hand, person B tells you that A is lying. Both of the persons
A and B are normally reliable, but you are more familiar with person A. Thus you
rely slightly more to person A than to person B. In such a situation it might be
plausible, that what the person A says is undercut by what B says. For comparison,
the person B is not claiming directly that ¬P , which would correspond to rebutting
defeat. His claim is not directed towards the opposite claim of P , but the very claim
of A. To be honest, we are not certain if the notion of undercutting by weaker default
makes sense, and even less certain if such situations might appear in the context
of moral reasoning. What we are certain of, is, that if one allows the undercutting
by weaker defaults, then one has to make some adjustments to other parts of the
theory. For these reasons, we have decided that it is best to omit the possibility of
undercutting by defaults with a lower priority.
In the next section we abandon our theories of reason interactions momentarily.
Instead, we describe and critize an appraoch to morality, in which certain default
principles (not reasons) play a key role. Later on in this thesis we return to develop-
ing our own approach of moral reasoning. At that point the idea of reasoning with
default reasons will become crucial again.
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4 Default Principles
In Chapter 6 of [13], Mckeever and Ridge argue that certain default principles have
a key role in moral thinking. They come to this conclusion by starting from the
assumption that we have moral knowledge in some particular cases. Obviously,
we (principled) particularists share this assumption that there are cases in which
we have moral knowledge about some particular action. Our view is not sceptical,
and neither are we defending our view against moral scepticism, but against moral
generalism. Mckeever and Ridge draw their default principles from particular cases
and they are aimed to carry over from one moral case to another. In fact, they intend
to construct principles, which contain "rational commitments implicit in any claim to
moral knowledge"(p.118 in [13]). In rough terms, their idea is to construct somewhat
simple hedged principles about, say, when killing a person is wrong. Instead of listing
the special cases where the principle fails to give the right outcome, they quantify
over all acts and try to include the exceptional cases in the principle. (By hedged
principle we mean that the principle has some conditions when it applies as opposed
to absolute principle. "Do not kill" is an example of an absolute principle, whereas
a toy example of a hedged principle could be "Do not kill except in circumstances
where there is even stronger reason to do so".) Later on in their book [13], they
argue in various ways that hedged principles are not enough for good moral thinking.
Instead, they think that ultimately one needs general unhedged principles.
The structure of this section is the following. We start by presenting Mckeever’s
and Ridge’s view. More precisely, we expose their view of default principles, the
general form of these default principles, and some examples them. We also explain
why they adopt their default principles and what they try to capture with them.
After exposing their view we argue that the default principles they have in mind fail
to play their intended role in moral thinking. More specifically, we will show that
there are cases in which the default principles are too weak. That is, cases where
the default principle should classify an act as right (or wrong), but it does not. We
are not claiming that in some cases default principles give the wrong moral verdict.
What we are claiming, however, is that default principles fail to capture some cases
in which we have moral knowledge. Note that if our criticism is fair and correct, this
much is enough. After all, we are defending principled particularism, which claims
that all moral verdicts cannot be determined with a fixed set of principles.
We will observe that the cases which are not evaluated properly by the default
principles share some common characteristics. Bearing this observation in mind,
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we then try to adjust the principle to find out if there is just a slight error in the
form of the principle. However, we will show that while this modification fixes the
original problem somewhat plausibly, it creates another problem. We will see that
the modified default principles are too strong. This is shown by constructing an
example, where the default principle says that an act is right in virtue of a reason
specified by the principle, but actually the action is not right in virtue of that reason.
Admittedly, our analysis in this example will be quite complicated. However, we
suspect that this complexity is caused by the general framework of subsuming all the
details in a situation under one principle. In our own approach we have a keen eye on
all the morally relevant features and their contributions to default logic determine
the moral verdict.
After pointing out the problems with default principles, we will argue that there is
something fundamentally wrong with this approach, and the problems cannot be
fixed with minor changes in the form of the principle. Quite contrary, we will argue
that the problems stem from deeper sources. In our view, if a default principle is to
work properly, then either it has to be so complex that it is not even a comprehensible
principle anymore (it is more like a list of different cases) or it has to capture this
complexity with generalizations. The problem with the latter option, as we will
later argue, is that either it produces default principles that are insufficient or it
produces default principles that are trivial. Insufficient principles, arguably like
Mckeever’s and Ridge’s default principles, are simple and comprehensible, but they
fail to give the right moral outcome in some cases precisely because of their simplicity.
On the other hand, there is not much hope in adjusting the generally articulated
conditions in principles enough to deal with the complexity of moral landscape.
Trivial principles are generated by adjusting the general conditions too much to fix
their problems, but at the same time as much as is necessary for it to work properly.
The problem is that if one tries to formulate default principles that are true, simple
enough for us to understand and capture all the exceptional cases properly, then we
get trivial principles like "Killing is wrong except when it is not". Or so we will
argue.
4.1 Mckeever’s and Ridge’s Approach
The book [13] is an influential book on the particularism versus generalism debate.
It outlines many important features of the contemporary state of the debate. For
instance, it is shown that the holism of reasons is compatible with generalism (p.27-
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32 in [13]), an observation that Dancy had failed to see in his early publications.
Mckeever and Ridge ultimately defend moral generalism, but they study moral par-
ticularism with great intensity. By painting with a very wide brush, the structure of
their argument for generalism in [13] has three different cornerstones. Firstly, they
argue that many forms of particularism should be avoided because their viability
depends on default reasons, and the concept of default reason is itself problematic.
Secondly, they turn to develop their own positive generalistic view, which depends
on default principles (note: not on default reasons). Thirdly, they defend princi-
ples based on their default principles. Somewhat surprisingly, they do not explicitly
present such general principles. However, these principles are supposed to be un-
hedged, unlike the default principles they introduce. They argue that after all,
although default principles are necessary for moral knowledge, they are not enough.
This is shown by three different arguments concerning the scope of moral knowledge,
the epistemology and modality of moral knowledge and by appeal to our intuition
about the structure of moral thinking.
Let us now introduce the view on default principles presented in chapter 6 of [13].
Consider some particular action. As said, Mckeever and Ridge assume we can have
moral knowledge about it. In their picture, the moral conclusion is drawn as follows:
In forming a moral judgement we register what we take to be the morally relevant
features of the case and then, assuming we have not left out any features which bear
upon the ultimate verdict, we draw our moral conclusion. (p.117 in [13])
We agree with this description of how one can judge some moral case. One has to try
to identify the morally relevant features as well as make sure that nothing relevant is
left out of consideration. Especially one has to look if any defeaters for the original
reason are present and also if there are some reasons for the opposite conclusion
compared to the conclusion given by the original reason. So there are two types of
auxiliary features that can make a difference for the moral conclusion. First type
consists of features which are undercutting defeaters for a moral reason. They are
features which defeat the status of the reason as a reason. The other type, known
as rebutting defeaters or countervailing reasons, are features which do not directly
undermine the status of the original reason as reason, but are reasons contributing
towards the opposite conclusion. Since Mckeever and Ridge are aiming to construct
a generalist view, they then ask the question if it is possible to capture the previous
reasoning, starting from a particular moral case, into a default principle. Their
idea is to build a principle which, rather than listing all the defeaters and opposite
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reasons, quantifies over them(p. 119 in [13]). These intentions in mind, they give a
spesific default principle telling about when killing a rational agent is wrong. Here
it is not essential that the principle is about killing a rational agent. Instead, they
give this example in order to expose the general form of default principles. They
claim that as far as we can have knowledge about when some feature is a reason for
action, we are committed to default principles of this form. If they were right, many
forms of particularism would be refuted, since we would have a concrete principle
indispensable for moral thinking. However, we will see that the default principles
do not yield right outcome for moral thinking. They fail to capture all instances in
which we have moral knowledge. Before that, however, we give their example of a
default principle:
Default Principle 4.1.1. For all actions (x): If (a) x is an instance of killing a
rational agent and (b) no other feature of the situation explains why the fact that
x is the killing of a rational agent is not a moral reason not to perform the action
and (c) any reasons to x do not (when taken collectively) outweigh the fact that x
is the killing of a rational agent, then x is wrong in virtue of being an instance of
killing a rational agent. (p.118 in [13])
Obviously, the clause (b) in the principle is intended to rule out the possibility that
the reason "being an instance of killing a rational agent" is defeated by undercutting.
On the other hand, the clause (c) should rule out the possibility that the reason is
defeated by rebutting. We will later see that the weak chain in this principle is the
clause (b). We think that the problems in (b) stem from too simple picture of how
features of a moral case can have an effect on the reason in question. Strangely, in
some parts of [13] the authors identify the possibility of metadefeaters, but ignore
this possibility almost completely in Chapter 6, where they formulate the default
principles. It is in our view precisely metadefeaters that make things more com-
plicated. Perhaps this ignorance is explained by other features of their approach.
They are sceptical that there can be indefinitely many defeaters and maetadefeaters.
From p.143 onwards in [13], they argue that a reliable reasoner has to be able to
recognize what can function as a reason or a defeater. Moreover, they claim that
in commonly faced situations there are only a limited number of different defeater
types. However, in our counterexample, we only need one metadeafeater, and one
is certainly not indefinitely many. Thus this defense of manageably many defeaters
misses our arguments as a target. For someone who is not familiar with the term
metadefeater, it just means some feature of the situation which is a defeater for a
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defeater of the original reason.
Before showing what is wrong in 4.1.1, a default principle concerning what is right
or wrong, we expose another kind of default principle that Mckeever and Ridge
endorse. This time the default principle is not about the moral status of an action,
but about giving a criterion when certain reason is indeed a reason. This kind of
principle is explicitly written in [13]:
Default Principle 4.1.2. For all actions (x) and all facts (F ):
If F is a fact to the effect that x would be pleasant and no other feature of the
situation explains why F is not a reason to x, then F is a reason to x. (p.120 in
[13])
So now we have an idea what kind of default principles Mckeever and Ridge have in
mind concerning the overall status of an action as well as a single reason in favour
of performing the act. In the next subsection we start our criticism towards default
principles by claiming that they are too weak. Put differently, there are cases in
which a default principle of the form 4.1.1 should rank an action right, but it does
not. They are cases in which we have moral knowledge, but the principle disagrees.
Similarly, there are cases in which a principle of the form 4.1.2 should rank a fact
as a reason to act, but it does not.
4.2 Default Principles Are Not Strong Enough
As said, both types of default reasons will be seen to be too weak, because they
ignore the presence of metadefeaters. There are many instances where the principle
gives a wrong outcome, and they are easy to formulate. The idea is that in both
of the principles, the clause about undercutting defeat of reason is flawed. (In 4.1.2
there is naturally only this clause. The clause about rebutting defeat would not be
sensible). The problem is that the principles both state that "no other feature of the
situation explains why F is not a reason to x...". In fact, there can be a feature that
would alone defeat the reasons status as a reason, if there is some further feature
which defeats the original defeater. Let us take a look on a concrete counter example
of a principle of the form 4.1.1.
Example 4.2.1. Let x be an action, which has the following features:
1) x is an instance of killing a rational agent.
2) x is performed during a battle in a justified war.
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3) The object of the act x is a civilian.
Suppose these are all the features that we know about the act x. Moreover, assume
that there are no other morally relevant features, which we have somehow failed
to identify. Thus we are neither violating the assumption that we have recognized
everything relevant nor the assumption that nothing relevant has gone unnoticed.
This point is crucial. We are not conducting a cheap trick of introducing further
features which would have an exceptional effect on the principle in question.
Intuitively, the act x is wrong. It is certainly wrong to kill a civilian in a war, unless
there is a good explanation for doing so. However, the default principle 4.1.1 does
not judge the act wrong. Why? Let us take a close look on the principle.
The effect of the clause (a) in the principle is clear: x is an instance of killing a
rational agent, so the first conjunct of the three holds. What about clause (b)?
Obviously, it does not hold, since there is a feature, namely 2), which explains why
the fact that x is the killing of a rational agent is not a moral reason not to perform
the action. In other words, it is not wrong to kill a rational agent during a battle
in a justified war.
We also take a look at the clause (c). In our example, it is the case that any reasons
to x (when taken collectively) do not outweigh the fact that x is the killing of a
rational agent. That this killing of a rational agent is performed in a justified war
and the victim is a civilian, does not outweigh the original reason. They do not
create a reason to kill that is stronger than the original reason not to kill. Thus (c)
holds.
The principle 4.1.1 is of the form ∀x((A(x)∧B(x)∧C(x))→ D(x)) and the second
conjunct B(x) does not hold. Consequently, the antecedent of the implication is
not true, and hence we have a counterexample. We formulated a description of an
act, which is wrong in virtue of being an instance of killing a rational agent, but
the principle is silent of this negative moral status. Consequently, the principle is
too weak to capture all the cases where an act is wrong due to being an instance of
killing a rational agent.
Let us now turn our attention to the default principle 4.1.2, which is intended to
give a criteria of when a reason remains as a reason. This principle faces a similar
problem as above. It is overly simplistic when it comes to defeating conditions of a
reason. Again, we give a concrete counterexample to this principle.
Example 4.2.2. Let x be an action, which has the following features:
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(1) F = x consists of telling other people that the performer of x has won in a
lottery.
(2) x is an instance of lying.
(3) x is performed in a bluffing game.
Suppose again that these features is everything we know about the act and no other
relevant features are present. Moreover, suppose it follows from F that the perfomer
of the act gains pleasure. Intuitively, F is a reason to x, since it gives pleasure to
its performer and F remains as a reason despite the other features of the situation.
By assumptions, x is an instance of harmless lie in a bluffing game, thus F is a
reason to x. However, the principle 4.1.2 does not agree with us. The fact that x
is an instance of lying, undercuts the status of F as a reason. It is a feature which
explains why F is not a reason to x. The principle is blind to the fact that there is
a further defeater for the lying; that the lie is performed in a game involving lying.
Thus the principle is too weak, and we have a counter example. Here F is a reason
to x, but the principle does not give this outcome.
It could be objected that we have not interpreted the default principle 4.1.2 prop-
erly. Perhaps McKeever and Ridge would claim that the clause (2) about being an
instance of lying is not here a feature, which explains why F is not a reason to x.
They could argue that the clause (2) does not describe such a feature, because there
is this further feature specified by (3). However, this line of thinking leads to our
approach. Such an interpretation would entail that we cannot separate one defeating
feature, but instead we have to consider every aspect of the act in question. Thus
we would end up with the following default principle:
Default Principle 4.2.3. For all actions (x) and all facts (F ):
If F is a fact to the effect that x would be pleasant and the description of x as a
whole does not explain why F is not a reason to x, then F is a reason to x.
But doesn’t this default principle mean the same as saying that pleasure is by default
a reason to act? If so, we agree with it. Moreover, in the previous chapter we have
specified what the part "the description of x as a whole does not explain..." means.
The meaning is specified by the default logic. More precisely, pleasure is a reason
to act in a particular case if it is a binding reason in that context (see definition
3.2.6). Having these observations in mind, we doubt that McKeever and Ridge
have not intended the interpretation 4.2.3 for the original default principle 4.1.2.
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Otherwise the principle is quite vague because, unlike us, they have not specified
what the part "the description of x as a whole does not explain..." means. Even
more importantly, such an interpretation of the default principle is compatible with
principled particularism - one of the doctrines that they are arguing against in [13].
So far we have seen that default principles do not succeed to capture all the acts and
reasons that they should. They are too weak. This is a serious problem for Mckeever
and Ridge, since clearly they intend to give default principles, which pick out every
instance of acts and reasons specified by the principle. They do not have in mind
default principles which, for instance, pick out only certain subset of actions which
are wrong due to being an instance of killing a rational agent. They have in mind
principles that have all actions as their scope, not principles that are systematically
silent for some of the cases when an action is wrong because of being an instance
of killing a rational agent. Most essentially, we have shown that default principles
cannot capture all of ethics, which is the claim that we are defending.
There are three strategies that might be helpful for Ridge and Mckeever. Firstly,
they might adjust the purpose of these principles. They might admit that the
principles do not capture every case, but for instance, a vast majority of cases or all
the typical cases we confront. However, this adjustment raises more questions than
it answers. Are the default principles then just practical rules of thumb, and not
principles answering the original questions of when something is a reason and when
something is wrong in virtue of some reason? Moreover, the cases we introduced
were quite simple after all, so is there any reason to believe that default principles
work even in majority of typically faced actions? Or is there some explanation of
why some cases and what kind of cases are left out by the default principles?
The second of the three strategies is to admit the error in the form of the default
principles and to try adjust them with a more fine-grained treatment of undermining
defeaters. There seems to be some hope in this line of thinking, as we noted that the
only problems where related to this specific aspect of the principles. In fact, we will
try to fix this spesific error, but it leads to other challenges. In the next subsection,
we try to modify the default principles to overcome the identified problem. We
will see, however, that this strategy creates some problems of its own. Moreover,
this strategy of modifying the principle leads towards particularism - the view that
they should be arguing against. The case is so, because if one adds more complex
criteria to the undercutting clause, then the scope of the principle diminishes. The
set of actions that fall under the description becomes smaller and smaller as one
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specifies all the metadefeaters in addition to first-order defeaters. At some point
the principles will perhaps have the same scope as Holton’s "That’s it" -principles.
Then they would capture everything that was claimed to capture, but as we have
earlier seen, these principles represent principled particularism.
The initial strategy of quantifying over defeaters did not work, so the principle has
to be more complex. But how much more? If one has to look at all the morally
relevant features of the action, then we have principled particularism; everything can
make a moral difference. Just slightly different cases are to be examined separately,
since some changes in the resultant base can yield a change in the moral evaluation.
The resultant base of an action means the set of natural (morally relevant) features
that it has. If on the other hand, the principle does not has to consider all the
possibly undermining features of the reason, then the question of which features it
has to, remains. And this question seems very hard. Luckily, in our own approach
to the topic this question is solved, or more accurately, it is avoided. We will shortly
return to this second strategy in the next subsection. First we will, however, take a
look at the third strategy.
The third strategy that Ridge and Mckeever might adopt is perhaps the most promis-
ing one. Actually, in [13] they do adopt this strategy. This strategy could be de-
scribed as a claim that although not perfect, their principles are the best that are
available. The idea is, as is a shared assumption in every camp of the debate, that
we humans cannot consider all the indefinitely many features in actions. At some
point one has to assume that no feature of the action that is not considered can un-
dercut the reasons status as a reason. This plausible assumption of limits in human
thinking lead them to write as follows:
"In so far as we can know that a given fact is a reason for an action, we are committed
to a principle of this form. For we can know that such a fact is a reason in a given
case without knowing every single fact of the situation; once again, our finitude
prevents this. So our knowledge that a given fact is a reason with a certain valence
relies on an assumption that none of the indefinitely many further facts we have not
yet considered undermines its status as a reason with that valence". (p.120 in [13].)
We admit that Mckeever and Ridge are right about the finitude of humans. However,
we can also respect this limitation in another approach and thus this feature does
not distinct their view as the only possible one. Bearing all the other problems of
default principles in mind, we see no good reason to adopt a view based on their
arguments.
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4.3 Modified Default Principles Are Too Strong
We try to fix the problem with default principles concerning metadefeaters. Recall
that the source of error was the clause (b) in the default principle 4.1.1. It stated
that no other feature of the situation, which defeats the original reason, can be
present. We observed that a defeater can indeed be present, if it is also defeated.
These observations in mind, let us try to formulate an instance of an improved
default principle:
Default Principle 4.3.1. For all actions (x): If (a) x is an instance of killing a
rational agent and (b) no other feature of the situation, which is not itself defeated,
explains why the fact that x is the killing of a rational agent is not a moral reason
not to perform the action and (c) any reasons to x do not (when taken collectively)
outweigh the fact that x is the killing of a rational agent, then x is wrong in virtue
of being an instance of killing a rational agent.
The modified version of the principle might look promising, because it clearly fixes
the earlier problems. However, next we will construct an example, which is ranked as
morally wrong by the modified version of default principle 4.3.1, but for the wrong
reason. This time the problem is located in the last line of the principle. More
precisely, we will see that the principle tells that the act of the example is wrong in
virtue of a certain reason, but actually it is wrong in virtue of another reason. This
false outcome is related to the problems with default principles seen above. Again,
we will see that the default principles are based on overly simplistic picture of moral
reasons and their interaction with other morally relevant features in a situation. We
construct our counterexample by describing a situation and step-by-step adding a
bit more complexity to it. Eventually, we will see where the problem is located in
the new default principle.
Example 4.3.2 (Kindergarden). Imagine a kindergarden with the following timetable.
Each monday, the children stay indoors before the noon playing and learning new
things. After lunch, the children move outside the building to play in the kinder-
garden yard. Most kids love the afternoon; they have many interesting games and
activities out in the yard. Now imagine that we find out that last monday, a child
was isolated from the others by one of the teachers. The child had to spend the
afternoon inside the house alone, with one teacher supervising him.
This is the initial story in our example. If this was all that we know about the case,
we would ask the teacher for an explanation for doing so. Plausibly, it is wrong
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to isolate a child from the others, if there is no explanation for doing so. Now the
default principle of the form 4.3.1, constructed from this particular action would be:
Default Principle 4.3.3. For all actions (x): If (a) x is an instance of isolating a
child and (b) no other feature of the situation, which is not itself defeated, explains
why the fact that x is the isolation of a child is not a moral reason not to perform
the action and (c) any reasons to x do not (when taken collectively) outweigh the
fact that x is the isolation of a child, then x is wrong in virtue of being an instance
of isolating a child.
Now suppose we meet the teacher and ask her why she did so. She replies that
the child who was isolated had broken the kindergarden rules in the morning, and
this was a typical and a deserved punishment for acting wrongly. This answer gives
us a legitimate explanation for the isolation, defeating the original reason of not
isolating a child. If we look at the default principle, the teacher’s answer would
alter the clause (b). Now there is a feature, which is not itself defeated and which
explains why the isolation of a child is not a moral reason not to perform the action.
Namely, the action being an instance of giving a deserved punishment for a child.
Intuitively, the action is not wrong and the principle agrees with our intuition.
Suppose another case in the kindergarden where, as above, a child was isolated
during the afternoon. The parents of the child find out that their children spent
the afternoon inside the house. Asking why it happened, the teacher explains that
this child is quite introvert and every now and then he wants to spend the afternoon
alone playing the computer inside the house. Again, in this case, the clause (b) is
altered, since now there is a feature, which is not itself defeated, explaining why the
isolation of a child is not a moral reason not to perform the action; the child wants
to be isolated. Also in this situation the default principle agrees with common sense,
there is nothing wrong to isolate a child during the afternoon, if the child wants to
be alone.
Let us describe the third and last situation in the kindegarden, which causes troubles
for the modified default principle. This time, a child is isolated during the afternoon,
it is intended as a punishment for his earlier wrong-doing, and the child wants to be
isolated. This cunning child had broken the rules in the morning, since he wants to
stay inside anyways. We will proceed analyzing this situation as follows. First we
look at what outcome the modified default principle gives, then we discuss what is
the intuitively right outcome and finally we observe why the default principle fails
in this situation.
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By the assumption, the act is an instance of isolating a child, and hence clause (a)
of the principle 4.3.3 holds. The clause (b) is a bit trickier. Now there are two
features of the situation, which both can independently explain why the fact that
the act is an instance of isolating a child is not a moral reason not to perform the
action. These two features are the fact that the isolation is intended as a deserved
punishment and the fact that the child wants to be isolated. Since we made the
modification to the clause (b) of the default principle, we also have to look if these
features are themselves defeated. In our case they are both indeed defeated. The
fact that the isolation of the child is intended as a deserved punishment is defeated
by the fact that the child wants it. One has no reason to punish someone in a way
that the object of the punishment wants. It makes no sense to punish a child for
wrong-doing in a way that is actually a reward for the child. Also the converse
holds: that the isolation is intended as a deserved punishment undercuts the fact
that the child wants it. The child wanting to be isolated is no longer any reason
to isolate him, if we are intending the isolation to be a deserved punishment. We
conclude that the clause (b) holds after all, there are no such features present that
would explain why the isolation is not a moral reason not to perform the action,
which are not themselves defeated.
The analysis of the clause (c) is also quite complex. The clause begins by picking
"any reasons to x" which in this case means any reasons to isolate the child. These
reasons are obviously that the child wants it and that the isolation is intended as
a punishment. However, the principle tells that we should take them collectively
and, somewhat surprisingly, together these features are not a reason to x. The
conjunction of these features is that the child wants to be isolated and we are
intending to punish the child by isolating. Obviously this conjunction is not a
reason to isolate the child and hence when we take the reasons to isolate the child
collectively, we have none. Thus the fact that the act is the isolation of a child is
not outweighed by countervailing reasons. Consequently, (a), (b) and (c) being true,
the principle tells us that the act is wrong in virtue of being an instance of isolating
a child.
According to our intuition, the outcome above is not the right one. The act was
wrong, but it was wrong in virtue of rewarding a child for his bad behaviour. Or
altenatively, it was wrong in virtue of punishing a child in a way that is not actually a
punishment and the child would have deserved a punishment. We conclude that the
principle gave us the wrong outcome. It simply was not anymore essential that the
act was about isolating a child. On the contrary, it was essential that we intended to
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punish the child and the child wanted to be the object of this spesific punishment,
since he happened to like it.
So we have seen that the modification did not help. Perhaps we did not modify
the principle enough? This time the problem was with taking all the countervailing
reasons collectively. One might instead formulate a principle that takes all the
countervailing reasons individually. However, there was a rationale to take them
collectively in the first place. If we would take them individually, even simpler cases
are not classified properly. Let us take an example from a practical domain dealing
with self-interest:
Example 4.3.4. Suppose you would get 5 dollars from person A if you perform x,
4 dollars from person B if you do not and 3 dollars from person C if you do not.
How should you act assuming x is something easy for you to perform and has no
consequences except the money paid for you? In our terminology, in this case there
are no undercutting defeaters - the rewards are independent from each other and
none of the reasons to act (rewards) is defeated. In this case, an example of an
undercutting feature might be that person D claims that person A is not reliable -
he will not pay you 5 dollars even if you perform x. This would defeat A’s promise
as a reason. But, as said, no such defeaters are present. So we have three reasons.
A’s promise being a reason to act, whereas B’s and C’s promises are countervailing
reasons for A’s promise. At this point the problem is obvious, since if we do not
take the countervailing reasons collectively, we end up in a conclusion that you
should perform x, since 5$ > 4$ and 5$ > 3$. This is absurd, since collectively, the
countervailing reasons add up to a reward of 7$ from not performing x, instead of
5$ from performing the act.
Thus, we conclude that countervailing reasons should be taken collectively.
4.4 Chapter Summary and Discussion
At this point we discuss our observations about Mckeevers’ and Ridge’s default
principles. Their idea was to build default principles which are implicit in any claim
to moral knowledge. They tried to construct default principles that are complex
enough to succeed in capturing the complexity of moral reasoning. At the same time
the default principles were intended to be simple enough to appreciate the finitude
of human thinking. Their idea was that we humans cannot check the indefinitely
many morally relevant features in an act that can make a difference to our original
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judgement. Otherwise we would be driven to scepticism, since we could always ask
if the one claiming to know the moral status of an action has looked if this or that
defeater was present. We principled particularists agree that at some point we have
to assume that everything relevant has been noticed and nothing else is relevant.
However, the shortcomings of their principles were not related to this assumption.
We only had two defeaters present and the situation was well described to us, but
still the default principle failed to work.
We think that the solution of avoiding the scepticism and admitting the finitude of
humans without constructing default principles is a better option. Our own view
will be described later, but the idea is that we think that one can in a particular
situation have moral knowledge, which is acquired in a justified way and is true,
without looking every indefinitely many aspects of the case. The main point is,
however, that this justification does not carry over to other cases in a patterned
way. It is not possible to formulate principles carrying over cases, because of the
complexity of the logic of normative reasons. Still, one can perform structured
reasoning in a fixed case. Moreover, our account can give some guidance to novel
cases, but this guidance is not principled. However, we know what features to look
for in a new case and what are the default moral imports of these features.
Setting aside our own approach, we saw that the default principles, formulated
by Mckeever and Ridge, do not work properly. They are too simple after all by
being blind to metadefeaters. We tried to fix this problem, but we saw that there
was another problem related to the countervailing reasons of a reason. We are, in
general, very doubtful of the idea of constructing hedged principles. We came to
this conclusion by observating that the modifications that one should do for the
principles, are such that they make the principle complex, uninformative and lead
towards particularism. Put differently, we particularist do accept principles like "
Killing a rational agent is wrong except when it is not" or "Killing a rational agent is
wrong unless something in the context explains why it is not". But these are hardly
moral principles anymore. The first one is necessarily true and the latter one is
true, but uninformative. Thus, we think, that the correct way to describe morality
is not with the help principles. They will always be insufficient to capture all of
ethics. Instead, we should have a keen eye on the richness of features in particular
cases and, on the other hand, have default reasons and their logic demanding the
consistency of judgement between different cases.
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5 Moral Epistemology
A natural starting point for presenting a picture of moral epistemology is to answer
the question of how we can acquire moral knowledge. Arguably this initial question
poses more difficulties for us particularists than it does for generalists. This is the
case since generalists can use the help of moral principles. For instance, a philosopher
of utilitarian tradition can quite easily explain the source of moral knowledge in his
framework of morality. There is a feature shared by all the right acts - that of
maximizing utility. Supposedly this principle is known a priori and it is taken to be
necessarily true. Thus morality has this a priori knowable necessarily true principle
as a basis. On the other hand, the moral status of some particular case is known by
applying this principle. Hence we have an explanation how we can acquire moral
knowledge about particular cases. This knowledge is partly based on the principle
and partly based on the contingent features of the situation. Nevertheless, moral
epistemology has a solid basis. The basis itself is justified by its intuitive appeal.
Thus we have presented a rough and ready description of moral epistemology of
generalist accounts in a space less than half a page. Obviously we took utilitarism
to represent generalistic accounts in general. The same descriptions apply, mutatis
mutandis, for other generalist doctrines. Whether one is a philosopher of Kantian
or even Rossian pluralist tradition, the structure of moral knowledge is similar. A
principle or prima facie duties is/are known a priori and it/they determine the moral
knowledge about particular cases.
Obviously particularists cannot base their epistemology on principles governing all
of morality. At first glance this raises some serious challenges. In the first section
of this thesis we already noted the danger of flattening the moral landscape. A
picture where moral knowledge consists of an unconnected list of evalutions of par-
ticular cases is very counter intuitive. It is so counter intuitive that without any
qualifications we would abandon it. There has to be something unifying the right
judgements about different cases. Although as particularists we maintain that even
a slight change in context may change the moral status of an action, there has to
be something that requires consistency of a moral reasoner. One does not just ar-
bitrarily judge one case as morally bad and other as right. Moreover, even if this
judgement would not be arbitrary, one has to be able to explain why some actions
are wrong and others are not. Unlike some particularists and some intuitionists, we
do not believe in a picture of moral epistemology, where the only source of moral
knowledge is some kind of moral perception. In such approaches, one just sees that
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some action is wrong, and the explanation for this wrongess is something that can-
not be articulated in a language. At the same time, we think that the pattern of
right actions is so complex that it cannot be captured with a finite set of finite
principles. Consequently, our view will operate in the middle ground between ex-
tremely particularist and generalist epistemologies. Our challenge is hence to give a
basis for moral epistemology, that is not articulated as a principle carrying over all
moral cases, that is not described merely as some moral perception that escapes any
description and that explains how different moral cases are dealt coherently, even
though there is not any fixed principle demanding this coherence. Before exploring
the available options for particularist theory of morality we make a remark about
consistency in moral thinking. In generalist theories, coherence (or, in this case, even
consistency) comes ’free of charge’. In any such widely known theory, the ultimate
moral principle(s) is consistent, which implies that moral thinking respecting the
principle is consistent. It is another debate if the theory is right, true or acceptable,
but when it comes to consistency, generalist theories have the initial advantage. For
example, an act cannot at the same time maximize happiness and not maximize it.
On the other hand, extremely particularist theories are safe from claims of inconsis-
tency, but for different reason. Suppose anything there is to say about morality is
to list how to act in different situations. Such doctrine is, in one sense, consistent.
It cannot be inconsistent, since it does not claim an existence of any connection
between judgements of different cases. Only different judgements about exactly the
same case would cause inconsistency. However, even extreme particularists typically
admit that morality supervenes on the natural, which entails that such extreme par-
ticularist view cannot be inconsistent. The case is so, because identical cases cannot
be judged differently and this was the only possibility for creating inconsistencies.
Having these remarks in mind we observe that our view is, at least initially, more
vulnerable to claims of inconsistency than its rivals.
5.1 Available Options for Epistemology
In the next subsection we will describe the foundation of our moral epistemology.
It is convenient, however, to first take a look on several options provided by other
authors. In the following we will see how different linguistic analyses of normative
sentences lead to different corresponding epistemologies, or vice versa. Consider
sentences like "Pain is bad", "Promoting pleasure is the right thing to do" and
"Cruelty should be avoided". Intuitively these are all true and meaningful sentences.
70
However, on a more philosophical level, it is and has been debated what is the
meaning of these sentences. We will soon explain how we would understand them,
but let us first take a short look on the numerous (others more sensible than others)
ways they could be analysed. Before that we make one rather technical remark.
Throughout this chapter we will speak almost interchangeably about the badness
and the wrongness of pain. A pedantic reader might find this bizarre, since badness
is a concept evaluating the value of some concept, whereas wrongness describes its
deontological status. We do not think, however, that this is a real problem. We are
of course primarily interested in wrongness rather than badness, since this thesis
is about normative reasons. Badness is considered merely because of convenience.
Moreover, there is of course some conceptual connection between normative and
value theoretic realms. For instance, it seems impossible that an act is good and
that the very same act is wrong in the same context.
Let us begin intrepreting the normative sentences written above. A hardy generalist
could understand that "pain is bad" means that any action that involves inflicting
pain is bad (or wrong) no matter what other features it has. Secondly, it could be
understood as a statement that pain always contributes against an action. Probably
such a generalist would claim that the source of these facts is the metaphysical nature
of pain. Moreover, these facts are knowable a priori by just considering the very
concept of pain. If we then take a step towards more holistic understandings of
reasons, we also get a few possible readings of the sentence. Inspired by the list
given by Dancy on page 113 in [4], we get interpretations like:
(1) Ceteris paribus, pain is a wrong-making feature.
(2) For the most part, pain counts against.
(3) Other things being equal, inflicting pain is wrong.
(4) In standard conditions, pain is bad.
(5) As a rule, pain is bad.
(6) Generally, inflicting pain is wrong.
Obviously a particularist cannot agree on the most generalist readings of the sen-
tence, which were presented before the list of six interpretations. Already holism
of reasons entails that it cannot be the case that, in any act involving pain, the
pain contributes against the action. The same is true for the most absolute inter-
pretation, that any action containing the feature of inflicting pain is automatically
wrong. Already common sense tells us that this reading is wrong. It is not wrong
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to vaccinate a child, although the treatment itself inflicts pain. Setting the most
absolute readings of the sentence aside, how do we analyze the interpretations (1) -
(6)?
The clauses (1) and (3) have some similarities. Clause (1) will, in fact, be closest to
our interpretation. However, we will use the terminology of pain counting against
by default. Nevertheless, it means roughly that pain contributes against performing
an act, unless there is some feature in the context which explains why it does not.
The clause (3) has the same idea, but at the level of pro toto reasons. It says that
inflicting pain makes the act (as a whole) wrong, unless something in the context
cancels the effect. Hence the clause (3) reminds Richard Holton’s interpretation,
which was discussed in Chapter 2 and was based on "That’s it" -statements. As
we have pointed out, there are some challenges in such an approach of treating an
act as a whole. The most serious challenge is that of losing the connection between
slightly different cases. Suppose, for instance, that two morally relevant features
change between similar cases. Assume further that the cases are judged differently.
We have no clue which of the distincting features makes the difference let alone what
is their effect to each other. We just know that the other act is right and the other
one wrong.
Let us then turn our attention to the interpretation (2). It is a statistical view about
the badness of pain. Arguably the claim is true in our actual world, but it has some
other deficits. Firstly, we might ask if it gives any explanation or reasonable analysis
about the nature of pain. It might be the case that it is just a cosmic accident that
in most cases pain counts against an action. Imagine a possible world where the
members of a rational species rarely experience pain except when breeding. In
that world, it would not be true that pain counts against an action for the most
part. Thus the interpretation in scrutiny would not classify "pain is bad" as a true
sentence in that world. According to our intuition, however, pain as such would be
equally bad in that world in all other instances except when occurring in breeding.
It seems odd to think that pain would be only contingently bad - bad depending on
the mutual ratio of desirable and non-desirable acts in the domain of all such acts
that involve infliction of pain. Hence we conclude that this interpretation would
ignore something very important in the nature of pain. We can argue this point
even further. Suppose that we would define dangerous places as places in which
people die usually. This definition would make home the most dangerous place on
earth, since people die at home more often than anywhere else. As with pain, we
think that this is even more accidental connection rather than explanatory. Thus
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this statistical analysis of the meaning of the sentence cannot be correct. We now
proceed to analyze the interpretation (4), and we acquire as a side product another
argument against the interpretation (2).
In [8], Margaret Little and Mark Lance analyze defeasible generalizations made in
moral epistemology and epistemology in general. Their interpretation corresponds
mostly to (4). Their illuminating example about fish eggs counts against the in-
terpretation (2) on different grounds than the modal argument presented above.
Consider the sentence "Fish eggs develop into fish". This sentence is certainly true.
Statistically thinking, however, most fish eggs never develop into fish. They are
eaten by predators, develop in the wrong temperature etc., which prevents them
from growing into actual fishes. As said, Lance and Little offer a different analysis
for defeasible generalizations like the ones about pain or fish eggs. They introduce a
concept of priviledged condition, which means such a condition that is especially re-
vealing of the true nature of the concept in question. The idea is that in priviledged
conditions, fish eggs do develop into fish. Anyone how understands the concept of
fish egg has to understand this essential feature about fish eggs. Similarly, in stan-
dard (or priviledged) conditions, pain is bad. Little and Lance give numerous other
illuminating examples. One of them deals with the game of soccer. In this case,
the priviledged conditions are given by FIFA rules. The standard type of soccer is
thus the well-known game played 11 vs 11 in a relatively large grass-covered field.
There are many exceptions to these priviledged conditions that we would also call
soccer: soccer played 3 vs 3 on a tiny field, children’s yard games with self-made
goals and soccer played in swamp terrain, to name a few. These "riffs" from the
standard, as they call them, belong also in the family of games of soccer. They point
out, that one cannot understand the riffs as exceptions of the standard case unless
one understands what the standard, priviledged conditions are like. Moreover, the
opposite does not hold. One can understand the basic FIFA soccer, without know-
ing about the exceptional forms of soccer. For instance, we doubt that few people
outside of Finland have heard about the soccer played in swamp. There seems to be
an explanatory asymmetry between priviledged conditions and exceptions that are
instances of the same concept. Regrettably, in this thesis we are not able to analyze
their interesting view in great detail. In our view, there might be some hope for
analyzing such sentences in their manner. On the other hand there are some obvious
challenges. Although priviledged conditions could be defined for the development of
fish eggs or soccer, the same seems much harder for pain or other natural properties
that are essential for normative reasons. What are the priviledged or standard con-
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ditions, where pain is bad? Further, can the cases where pain is not bad explained
as exceptions from the standard conditions? These seem to be hard questions. Ad-
mittedly, in our world we have a grasp of what are the standard conditions where
pain is bad. Also we think that Lance and Little are right in claiming that one
can only understand that pain is not bad when occurring, for instance, in athletic
achievement if, in the first place, one knows that pain is bad in standard conditions.
Our worry is about modalities. Should we understand the priviledged conditions
world-wise or as necessary, i.e. so that there are fixed priviledged conditions for a
given concept in all of the possible worlds?
Let us first choose the earlier option. Suppose priviledged conditions vary between
different possible worlds. In our world, we have quite good grasp of the priviledged
conditions of when pain is bad. That is, almost always except in athletic achieve-
ments, in treatment of diseases etc. Note that as particularists, we think that even
in our world it impossible to complete the previous list. However, we can safely
assume that we have a good enough grasp of the priviledged conditions. Consider
then the world described earlier, where the species experiences almost all instances
of pain when breeding. Probably they would not consider pain experinced in breed-
ing as bad. Quite contrary, they would treat such pain as either neutral side-product
of this important action, or even as a feature improving the action. Consequently,
the species would have a very different understanding of the priviledged conditions.
They might consider breeding as the most revealing condition of the nature of pain,
since pain is so rarely experienced in other actions. If so, they would end up in a
very different analysis of the nature of pain. For them pain might be good, and the
priviledged conditions for this true nature of pain would be the acts of breeding.
We conclude that if priviledged conditions are contingent, then so is the nature of
the corresponding concepts. This seems to be an unwanted consequence, since the
approach based on priviledged conditions was intended to give a metaphysical expla-
nation for concepts such as pain. We are now ready to conclude what is odd with this
interpretation that priviledged conditions vary between different possible worlds. It
seems that there is nothing necessary in the metaphysical nature of pain that makes
it bad. Its badness stems from contingent features of the world in question.
Suppose then that for a given concept, such as pain, there are necessary priviledged
conditions. In all possible worlds, these fixed priviledged conditions are the most
revealing of the nature of pain. This option seems much more promising. There is
one issue, however, that might be a problem for this theory. The issue is epistemic.
How can we know what are the priviledged conditions? Obviously we cannot give
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as much weigh for our own experience as we did in the previous option. It might be
the case that the instances of the concept we face in actual world represent a biased
sample of the concept. Put differently, the conditions actually held priviledged
might be just riffs and the real priviledged conditions so rare or completely absent
in our world that we do not recognize them. By trusting in our experiences, we
might end up in the wrong definition of priviledged conditions. At best, it would
give us a posteriori justification for a necessary proposition, which is generally quite
problematic. On the other hand, a priori justification would be hard to acquire
because of the following circularity. As a starting point we are considering the
question of what is the true nature of some concept (pain for example). Then we
define that the true nature of that concept appears in the priviledged conditions
for that concept. Moreover, we are trying to decide what are these priviledged
conditions. So should we use the help of the true nature of the concept to find the
priviledged conditions or vice versa? For us it seems that one has in some way or
another know either the nature or the priviledged conditions before knowing the
other. But in this interpretation, where the prividged conditions are necessary, we
cannot know either, or at least, we do not have a reason to believe in either.
At this point we return to analyze the list of interpretations exposed earlier. We had
only interpretations (5) and (6) left. To be honest, they do not offer new options
for the right interpretation. The case is so, because as such they are quite vague
and very close to interpretations (2) and (4). The real question would be what is
the more detailed analysis of these natural language qualifiers. Consequently, the
challenge seems again to be how to analyze the qualifiers "generally" and "as a rule"
in a more sophisticated way.
We now present one last option of how to analyze the sentence "pain is bad" before
painting our own picture of the state of affairs. An extremely particularist way of
thinking is to claim that it is merely a mistake to search for the deeper meaning or
analysis of that sentence. Such general claim about pain is nonsense, since pain as a
reason for or against an action is only meaningful in a specified context. Recall that
particularists hold that any change in the context can defeat a normative reasons
status as a reason. Consequently, for such extreme particularist, it only makes
sense to ask if pain is bad in this case or that case. The general speak about the
goodness or badness of pain is meaningless. In such a view, the general normative
status of natural features like pain or pleasure is just an illusion. These concepts
are normatively underdetermined before put into some context. Admittedly, this
view is not inconsistent. However, this if any view is vulnerable to the argument
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of flattening the normative landscape. We see just how radical this view is, if we
look at its consequences. In this picture all the natural features possible to appear
in an act have the same initial normative import. Shoelace color, pain and pleasure
have no normative force outside of specified context. In some case pain makes the
action wrong, in another (against a rich enough background) shoelace color makes it
wrong. For this extremely counter intuitive reason we abandon this view. Morality
might be complex, but not completely shapeless and at the same time supervenient
on the natural features.
5.2 Foundational Default Reasons
We summarize a bit at this point. We are defending a particularist view and at-
tempting to explain how we can have a coherent moral epistemology without moral
principles. Previously we analyzed several ways of understanding the sentence "pain
is bad". Different linguistic analysis lead to different pictures of moral epistemology
varying from atomistic views to views allowing holism in the moral import of pain.
These views were based on hedged principles or defeasible generalizations. We are
now ready to explain how we understand the sentence "pain is bad". The basic point
is simple enough. Like Jonathan Dancy, we think it is in the metaphysical nature
of pain that it is bad by default. In earlier sections we have defined formally how
default reasons interact with each other and with other morally relevant considera-
tions. Thus the we have a good grasp of what it means that pain is a default reason
against an action. Inflicting pain is wrong by default, i.e. it is always wrong, unless
there is a feature (which is not itself defeated) in the context which explains why
it is not wrong. This, we think, is everything that we can say about the normative
effect of pain at this level of generality. Any general principle will have exceptional
cases which will prove that the principle does not hold universally. Our goal is to
describe a view where we do not need any fixed principles like in traditional ethical
theories or any hedged principles like in Mckeever’s and Ridge’s view.
The basis of our view are what we will call metaphysical or foundational default
reasons. Default reasons (foundational or not) are generic pro tanto reasons, which
are specified by their descriptive features and have some default moral valence, be it
positive or negative. Lying, inflicting pain, insulting etc. have all a negative moral
status by default, whereas pleasure, honesty and loyalty have a positive status again
by default. These all qualify as foundational default reasons. We give two criterions
that define foundational default reasons:
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Definition 5.2.1 (Foundational Default Reasons). We say that a default reason is
foundational, if it satisfies the following conditions:
(1) Its default moral valence is a priori knowable.
(2) It has no qualifiers.
The purpose of the condition (1) should be quite clear. We do not want features like
shoe-lace color, day of the week or some person’s nationality to count as foundational
default reasons in the normative domain. In a context specified enough, all of them
can have a crucial moral import. The point is, however, that we cannot know their
default moral valence a priori. In fact, we have a reason to believe that they do not
have any default valence. When they make a moral difference, there is something
in the context which explains this. On the other hand, features like pleasure, pain
and honesty are different. They have a default moral valence, and we can know it
just by reflecting the very concept.
What about the condition (2) then? It demands that a foundational default reason
cannot have any qualifiers. The idea of this constraint is the following. A founda-
tional default reason has to be as simple and as general as possible. Pleasure, for
instance, is a foundational default reason, whereas sadistic pleasure is not, because
of the qualifier "sadistic". Logically speaking, the set of possible acts each involving
sadistic pleasure is a subset of the set containing all possible acts involving pleasure.
Thus by demanding this absence of qualifiers, we guarantee that we will always pick
a concept as general as possible. This creates also epistemic and explanatory conse-
quences. A foundational default reason is epistemologically as simple and as general
as possible. One can know what the concept pleasure means without knowing what
sadistic pleasure means, but the opposite does not hold. Moreover, that some act
involved sadistic pleasure can only function as an explanation for its normative eval-
uation, if pleasure as such could have functioned as an explanation for its normative
evaluation.
One worry that the reader might address to the previous definition is the follow-
ing. The condition (2) is very dependant on the superficial structure of language.
Different languages have different words, varying in specificy, for the same con-
cept. Finnish for example, has probably more fine-grained expressions for different
types of snow than english does. The word “nuoska”, for instance, means roughly
the same as the qualified expression “wet snow” in english. Undoubtedly the same
phenomenon happens with words directly relevant to morality. Also the same phe-
nomenom happens inside a language. For instance, what is the logical relation of
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ache and pain? One might think that this causes problems, since it is possible to
express some reason without qualifiers using a spesific word, or with more general
word restricted with some qualifier. Consequently, something being a foundational
reason might depend on how the reason is expressed. However, we will see that this
is not a serious problem. In principle, it is possible to find the simplest and most
spesific word denoting to some concept. Moreover, different expressions for the same
reason would not alter the extension of right and wrong.
An attentive reader might see some similarities between the condition (1) of the
previous definition and Little’s and Lance’s definition of priviledged conditions. Let
us take pain as an example again. Recall that Lance and Little made defeasible
generalizations analyzed with the help of the concept of priviledged conditions. In
their taxonomy, it is known that in priviledged conditions pain is bad. Above, on the
other hand, we stated that pain is bad by default. Are we, after all, just expressing
the same idea in different words?
At first glance, the doctrines might indeed seem similar. However, this is not the
case. Lance and Little themselves write:
"...This point helps to illustrate an important difference between something carrying
a defeasible import and operating as an epistemic default. To call something a
default is to say that it is a justified "start here" position - an assumption one is
entitled to make in the absence of special evidence to the contrary. Now we believe
that defaults are essential to epistemology; in particular, we believe that they are
essential if we are to be protected from skeptical collapse. For all that, though,
they are thoroughly distinct from defeasible connections. A defeasible import is
the import something has in suitably privileged conditions, the understanding of
which is thought crucial to understanding the theoretical significance of the kind. A
default import is the import that an epistemic agent, in her local epistemic enclave,
is justified in assuming a property has until presented with evidence to the contrary.
A defeasible import may function as a default; but it precisely won’t when one is in
a deviant situation." (p.450 in [8])
Thus default reasons are not dependant on priviledged conditions unlike Lance’s
and Little’s defeasible generalizations. We see this feature as an advantage, since
we found the concept of priviledged condition problematic. Default reasons are in
this respect more fundamental concepts than defeasible generalizations. We do not
need to know the priviledged conditions and their boundaries. If we suppose that
we need defeasible generalizations based on priviledged conditions at all, their shape
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is specified by learning and progressing with the help of default reasons.
We have presented a starting point for moral epistemology and moral thinking more
generally. Foundational default reasons are in key role and they make our epistemol-
ogy foundational. Obviously, foundational default reasons do not themselves offer us
a viable position in ethics. No act is an act of inflicting pain and not satisfying any
other description. In the next subsection we will turn our attention to the coherence
of our epistemology.
At this point we know that there are some default reasons, namely foundational
default reasons. In Chapter 3 we explored how default reasons interact with each
other and contextual, but morally relevant features of a given situation. However,
this alone will not carry us far in moral thinking. We will also need derived default
reasons. It would be an enormous task, if not completely impossible, to identify the
foundational default reasons and their interactions in complex moral situations we
face. Still, foundational default reasons provide us a solid basis for moral thinking.
Without appropriate foundational default reasons our morality could be completely
mistaken. They prevent the possibility of a downright crazy picture of morality, in
which for example one should always kill other people if possible.
Before proceeding to next subsection and the construction of derived default reasons,
we return to a problem presented in Chapter 1.2 of this thesis. The problem was
about the possibility of different presentations of the same situation. McKeever and
Ridge argue that there is no way in telling which description of the following two is
correct:
(1) Is pleasure a default reason in favour of acting and sadism its defeater,
or
(2) Is nonsadistic pleasure a default reason in favour of acting and the absence of
sadism its enabler? (p. 51 in [13])
We are happy to remark that our definition of foundational default reasons has
solved their problem. The correct answer is the option number (1). This is the case,
since in option (2) “nonsadistic” is a qualifier and thus nonsadistic pleasure is not
a foundational default reason. We conclude that option (1) is the more fundamen-
tal reading of the situation. Obviously, this conclusion is highly dependant on the
structure of language. Suppose momentarily that we had an english word "nonsad-
pleasure" meaning the same as nonsadistic pleasure. According to our definition,
nonsadpleasure would qualify as a foundational default reason. Its default moral
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valence would be a priori knowable and it would have no qualifiers. It is important
to note that, for nonsadpleasure, neither sadism would be a defeater nor the ab-
sence of sadism an enabler. The reason for this is that nonsadpleasure specifies in
its very meaning that there is no sadism present and that sadism is absent. To use
the terminology of Chapter 3, nonsadpleasure would not be triggered in contexts,
where sadism was present. Pleasure as such, by contrary, can be triggered in con-
text where there is also sadism present. So, at the end of the day, what counts as a
foundational default reason depends on the structure of language. If language was
different then so would be the set of foundational default reasons. However, this
would not alter the extension of right and wrong acts. The case is so because the
corresponding defeaters and enablers would change accordingly. Moreover, at the
level of particular judgements our distinct foundational default reasons would work
similarly. In this sense our moral epistemology is not dependant on language. We
think that any reasonable language would reflect the a priori notion specified by the
defintion 5.2.1.
Let us return to the original language english. As a matter of fact, in the next
subsection we will see that also option (2) is a legitimate description of the situation,
but this fact we cannot explain until we have the concept of a derived default reason.
5.3 Derived Default Reasons
According to the considerations above, our moral epistemology represents founda-
tionalism. Foundational default reasons play the role of basic beliefs. The account is
superior to many other foundationalist approaches, since foundational default rea-
sons claim so little. For instance, the rossian prima facie duty of keeping promises
entails the foundational default reason of keeping promises. However, the other di-
rection does not hold. Keeping a promise counts in favour of acting by default rather
than always. Thus we are more safe from accusations of having a feeble basis for our
epistemology than most rivals. On the other hand, this creates a challenge. Can we
cope in morality with such a modest foundation? We think so, but we need the help
of derived default reasons, which inherit their justification from foundational ones.
In the next definition it is described how one can construct derived default reasons.
Definition 5.3.1 (Derived Default Reasons). The set of derived default reasons for
an agent S is constructed recursively as follows:
(1) Initially, every foundational default reason is a default reason for S.
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(2) If F is a default reason for S and D its defeater, then FD = F ∧D becomes a
default reason for S, which has the opposite moral valence than F and F¬D = F∧¬D
becomes a default reason for S, which has the same moral valence as F .
(3) If in some context a feature E enables another feature F to be a triggered default
reason, then FE = F ∧ E becomes a default reason for S.
As an example, consider the case about sadistic pleasure. Assume someone rightly
believes that pleasure as such is a default reason, call it F , in favour of acting. He
then confronts a situation of someone gaining pleasure from violating another person.
He realizes that in this situation the pleasure gained from acting makes the act even
worse than it would have been without it. Thus he concludes that the feature of
sadism, D, is a defeater for F . According to the condition (2) of the previous
definition, his observation creates two new default reason, FD and F¬D, which he
should endorse. Obviously, FD is the default reason saying that sadistic pleasure is
a reason againts acting, whereas F¬D is the default reason saying that non-sadistic
pleasure is a reason in favour of acting. After this observation, he may not treat F as
a default reason anymore, since FD and F¬D already cover all the possible instances,
where F is triggered. If the agent in question modifies his set of numerous default
reasons as instructed above, we can say that he has made moral progress. He has
made a new distinction in the set of acts involving pleasure. With the help of the
concrete example we have gotten a flavour how the above definition works. It is also
important to note that the process of updating one’s default reasons may continue
indefinitely long. This is where the principled particularism lies in our account.
We can never reach some end point, where we have a complete understanding of
what kind of moral import some descriptive feature can have. There are always
new combinations of descriptive features in possible acts and all of ethics cannot
be captured with default reasons given in advance. On the other hand, we have a
principled justification in particular cases.
We end this chapter by returning to the worry of Mckeever and Ridge about the
epistemological and metaphysical priorities of different presentations for the same
default reason. At the end of the previous section, we were able to argue why the
option number one about pleasure as such was metaphysically and epistemologically
prior to the option number two about nonsadistic pleasure. Now, with the help of
the previous definition, we can explain why the option number two is, after all,
also a right interpretation. The option one corresponds to an agent, who has not
encountered, thought of, or realized the possibility of pleasure occuring in sadistic
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act. When thinking, commiting or being exposed to such act, he should remark that
sadism is a defeater for his initial default reason about pleasure as such. On the
other hand, option number two corresponds to an agent, who has already made the
distinction to sadistic and nonsadistic acts among the acts giving pleasure. For him,
nonsadistic pleasure is a default reason in favour of acting and sadistic pleasure is a
default reason against acting.
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6 Conclusions and Discussion
In this thesis we have argued in favour of principled particularism and presented
an account representing it. We have criticised extreme particularism and general-
ism, especially those versions relying on defeasible principles. In this last chapter
we first compare our approach to John Rawls’ method of narrow reflective equilib-
rium. It has some similarities with the approach based on foundational and derived
default reasons. After this comparison we conclude this thesis by discussing some
consequences that our framework has for moral thinking.
As mentioned, derived default reasons are acquired with a method which reminds
John Rawls’ notion of narrow reflective equilibrium (p.18-19 and 42-45 in [14]). This
is quite surprising, since usually the notion is associated with a coherentist episte-
mology. In narrow reflective equilibrium one seeks coherence between principles and
particular judgements. For example, one might initially hold a belief in the principle
that it is wrong to inflict pain. Then, for instance, one confronts a situation where
pain is inflicted in a medical treatment and accepts this act even though it is in-
compatible with the original principle. To prevent the incoherence, one updates his
initial principle to match this particular judgement. In general, neither principles
nor particular judgements are safe from revision as one seeks the greatest overall
coherence of beliefs. If such a state is reached, we can say that the agent is in a
reflective equilibrium.
We apply a quite similar method, but it is directed to default reasons rather than
principles. This method, which specified in the definition 5.3.1, has some advan-
tages over Rawls’ method. One does not need to seek for the reflective equilibrium.
In fact, one is in an equilibrium all the time. This equilibrium is guaranteed by
stable scenarios (see Chapter 3). One’s default reasons are coherent with particular
judgements, since the judgements are made based on the logic of default reasons.
Moreover, one does not have to reject a previously held principle unlike in Rawls’
account. Let us take an example. In Rawls’ account we have to admit that the prin-
ciple about the wrongess of inflicting pain was wrong. The correct principle would
have been something like "It is wrong to inflict pain except in medical treatment".
Obviously, this principle may also be revised if we encounter another exceptional
particular case. On the other hand, the default reason "inflicting pain is wrong
by default" remains true even after we have encountered the exception. Instead
of revising the original default reason, we specify it. One moves to another stable
scenario. Inflicting pain is still wrong by default, but it is not wrong, by default, to
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inflict pain in medical treatment.
So we initially claim less with foundational default reasons than is claimed with prin-
ciples in Rawls’ account. We identify some advantages in our account. Firstly, our
account is foundational, since the basic beliefs expressed with foundational default
reasons are not justified by other moral beliefs. Moreover, as we have explained,
foundational default reasons are not rejected anywhere during the process. We have
a solid basis and we are safe from claim of endless regress, which is problematic for
coherentist approaches in general. Secondly, our theory has a feature, which is held
desirable in general philosophy of science. It is better to claim less and more reliably
rather than more and less reliably. We stick to our claims. On the other hand, we
cannot rely to a person using the method of reflective equilibrium - he may change
his principles in the future. Even worse, in his current state of the process he may
posses principles which are not correct.
There are also some shared ideas between Rawls’ method and the one based on
default reasons. Both present a picture of morality which is open to moral progress.
This, we think, is a highly plausible feature. Intuitively, morality is a work in
progress rather than a puzzle that is already solved. Our account can also explain
moral progress, moral disagreement, moral regret as well as moral uncertainty. The
existence of these phenomena are very hard to explain for a generalist. If one gives a
universal principle in advance, it is hard to find any room for progress for instance.
Perhaps a generalist can explain some of these phenomena by claiming that the
problem is not in the principle per se, but in specifying which acts fall under the
principle. For example, it might be hard to tell in practise which option maximizes
the utility, but it is still true that the one maximizing it is the right option. This
might explain some of the mentioned phenomena, but at the same time the utilitarist
admits that there is some vagueness in his approach. How can such a principle guide
our thinking, if it is hard or impossible to determine the actions falling under it?
Let us then focus on these moral phenomena inside our framework. We have already
considered the issues of moral progress (above) and moral regret (in Chapter 2.3).
Moral disagreement, we believe, can stem from the fact that different people have
encountered different situations and hence updated their default reasons differently.
However, they can explain each other their reasons in that particular case and
perhaps reach an agreement. Moral uncertainty, on the other hand, can be caused
by the challenge of recognizing enablers and defeaters. There is no principled way of
determining what is a defeater for a reason, and hence we are very likely to encounter
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situations where it is hard to tell if some feature affects the reason or not.
Last but not least, we return to Richard Holton’s principled particularism. In Chap-
ter 2 it was observed that Holton’s principles offer no help in guiding our moral
thinking although they can justify particular judgements. Our account can also jus-
tify particular judgements as well as give guidance to novel cases. Holton’s account
represents a compromise position between extreme particularism and generalism.
Consequently, we can say that our account is a further compromise between his
compromise and generalism. We believe that the best alternative for moral thinking
is located right there in the middle ground, in principled particularism.
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